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Gregory (c.330-c.395) lived in the wake of tremendous change in the Christian 
world. The generation before had witnessed the end of the persecutions of Diocletian (c. 
305), beheld the conversion of Constantine and his edict of toleration (313), and 
navigated the first wave of the Arian controversy through to the council of Nicaea (325). 
These events together created the environment for Gregory’s thought and framed the 
central questions for Cappadocian theology.  
The council of 318 bishops at Nicaea had been a success for Athanasius’s party 
and, for Constantine’s part, had established a feasible precedent for the spiritual unity of 
the empire. On both the theological and the political fronts, however, the victory at 
Nicaea had not been decisive. The Arian believers within the empire were still 
unconvinced by the deliberations and declarations of men in faraway council.1 
Constantine himself continued to vacillate between the Arian and Nicene factions 
throughout his lifetime, and when he chose the Arian bishop of Constantinople to 
administer his deathbed baptism, he anticipated (or perhaps, precipitated) the fortune of 
the church for the next half century.  
Constantine’s dynastic legacy did not bear the fruit of political or theological 
unity that he had worked for: his sons divided the empire again into east and west, Arian 
and Nicene. Constantius II (337-361), emperor in the east, supported Arian Christianity 
over the Nicene believers, and ten years after the end of the council those who had 
celebrated a victory in the church were again out of favor.2 The Cappadocians and their 
                                              
1 For a more detailed narration of the development and ongoing nature of the competing homoian 
theology, see Lewis Ayers’s nuanced discussion in Nicaea and its Legacy: an approach to fourth-century 
Trinitarian theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): 100-153.  
 
2 Anthony Meredith, The Cappadocians (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995): 
2. While Constantius II reigned over the empire Jerome made his famous observation that “The world woke 
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contemporaries, successors to Nicaea, worked to provide a fuller image of orthodox 
belief – clarifying both the nature of the God in which they placed their faith, as well as 
the implications of that belief in the world.  
Gregory of Nyssa was born at the beginning of the Arian resurgence to an 
impoverished, albeit distinguished, family in Cappadocia with deep Christian roots.3 
There are few details about Gregory’s early life, but he revealed in his writing a deep 
investment in the life of his family. His youngest brother Peter was a fellow bishop and 
his correspondent throughout his lifetime. Naucratius died an early death, but his meek 
monastic example prefigured the ascetic piety of his family.4 His famous elder brother 
Basil, around five years his senior, had attended university at the school in Athens, and 
became an influential monastic and bishop. His sister Macrina, born around 327, was a 
tremendous spiritual force – Gregory himself refers to her in rapid succession as a 
“good”, “noble”, and “invincible athlete” in faith in his work commemorating her saintly 
life.5 Of Gregory’s illustrious siblings, Basil and Macrina occupied most of his attention, 
and he considered both to be his most important academic and spiritual teachers.6  
Although in his early days he had been a lector for the church, Gregory’s first 
vocation was a secular career as a teacher in rhetoric (following his father), and he was 
                                              
up as from a slumber, and discovered itself to be Arian.” St. Jerome, The Dialogue with the Luciferians, 
329. 
 
3 Gregory of Nyssa, Life of Moses, xiv. Gregory himself was a third generation Christian, and was 
born around 335, the tenth year after the first council at Nicaea. Anthony Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa 
(London: Routledge, 1999): 2-3.  
 
4 Gregory of Nyssa, Life of Macrina, 967-968. 
 
5 Life of Macrina, 962, 968, 974. 
 
6 Meredith, The Cappadocians, 52-53. His two great anthropological treatises, On the making of 
man and On the soul and resurrection both preserve the enormity of Basil and Macrina, respectively, in 
Gregory’s thought.  
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presumably married to a woman by the name of Theosebeia. Under the influence of 
friends and family - including the third Cappadocian Father, Gregory of Nazianzus – he 
sought the monastic life in a community on the Iris established by Basil.7 His venture into 
the contemplative life, however, was not to last. In the end it was Basil’s ambitions, 
rather than Gregory’s, that guided his path into formal ecclesiastical affairs.  
The imperial support of Arian clergy and doctrine had been disrupted under the 
reigns of Julian (361-363) and Jovian (363-364), and ever since the accession of the 
Valentinian dynasty (364-) issues of worship and religion within the empire had once 
again become matters of maintaining peaceable coexistence within the state.8 One of 
Valens’s acts, in order to maintain a balance of power between the Nicene and Arian 
parties, was to divide the bishopric of Cappadocia into two. Basil, who had previously 
been the sole regional bishop, now oversaw from one of these Cappadocian capitals – 
Caesarea.9 Therefore, he appointed Gregory, despite his protests, to a newly established 
position overseeing the bishopric of Nyssa around 371. The appointment was an 
important move for Basil as it strengthened his jurisdiction in the region as he and other 
Nicene Christians once again waited for imperial favor. It was Basil’s hope that Gregory 
might confer distinction upon his post rather than the assignment conferring honor upon 
                                              
7 Johannes Quasten, Patrology, v.3 (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics Inc., 1986): 254-255. 
Basil, for a time, lived the ascetic life of contemplation in a community on the opposite bank of his mother 
and sister and developed his teaching on the common life of what would become cenobitical monasticism. 
Mary Emily Keenan, “De professione Christiana and de perfecetione: a study of the ascetical doctrine of 
Saint Gregory of Nyssa” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 5 (1950): 171.  
 
8 Juliette Day, Raimo Hakola, Maijastina Kahlos et. al, eds., Spaces in Antiquity: cultural, 
theological, and archaeological perspectives, (Abington-on-Thames, UK: Routledge, 2016): 28. Ayers, 
169-171. Meredith, The Cappadocians, 53. Valens and Valentinian together promoted freedom in worship, 
although Valens (364-378), the eastern emperor, did maintain the practice of dismissing trouble-making 
Nicene bishops during his reign. Gregory himself was exiled in 375 only four years after being established 
in Nyssa, only to return after the death and defeat of Valens at Adrianople in 378.  
 
9 Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, 4. The other, Tyana, was held by a new homoian bishop.  
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him.10 By the end of his career Gregory raised the see of Nyssa to the status that his 
brother had envisioned, but Basil would not live to see it accomplished. Indeed, during 
his lifetime Basil often complained of Gregory’s lack of political wit, administrative 
efficiency, and skill in financial management.11 Nyssen’s lack of attention to the formal 
requirements of ecclesial office did not, however, preclude his capacity for theological 
and pastoral teaching, nor did it disqualify him as a champion of the Nicene declaration at 
the second ecumenical council at Constantinople in 381.  
This period, before and briefly after the council at Constantinople, was Nyssen’s 
most prolific period for theological work. Just after being established in his bishopric 
(371), Gregory wrote his first ascetic treatise On virginity.12 After his brother’s death in 
379, Gregory composed his great series of polemics against neo-Arian theology. 
Continuing also on his brother’s exposition of the six days of creation (Hexameron), 
Gregory wrote his treatise On the making of man to describe the nature and place of 
humanity in creation. Although he wrote primarily to preserve Basil’s memory, the 
potency of his thought gained the attention of other Nicene bishops and allowed Gregory 
to come fully into his own as a theologian and ecclesiastical leader.13 Indeed, soon after 
Basil his sister Macrina passed, presumably with Gregory at her side. From his final 
                                              
10 Life of Moses, xiv. Despite what follows, Gregory would indeed distinguish himself and his 
bishopric, remembered along with Gregory Nazianzus and his brother, Peter, as “foremost champions of 
piety” and bishops of “brilliant distinction.” Theodoret, Ecclesiastical History, 386. 
 
11 Meredith, The Cappadocians, 53. Quasten, 254.  
 
12 Quasten, 269-270. Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, 5. 
 
13 Nathan Howard, “Familial Askêsis in the Vita Macrinae” Studia Patristica 47 (2010): 33. 
Quasten, 258.  
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conversation with her, Gregory purports to have recorded On the soul and the 
resurrection, writing down his sister’s words as she was “inspired by the Holy Spirit.”14  
The religiously turbulent period that had characterized Gregory’s life to this point 
had finally ended. With the Arian emperor Valens crushed at the battle of Adrianople 
(378) and Arian doctrines condemned by the second ecumenical council under 
Theodosius (381), Eunomius and any others not in communion with those bishops 
affirming “the hypostasis of three Persons of equal honor and of equal power,” would not 
remain in authority over the churches.15 Never again would an Arian ruler preside over 
the eastern half of the empire, and the homoian faith – a spent force in the battle for 
political hegemony – began to slowly decline and divide.16 
Gregory, for his part, spent the final years of his life exercising his rhetorical 
talent, defending established orthodoxy and turning his attention to more pastoral and 
mystical theology. He delivered the funeral oration for Meletius, bishop of Antioch, who 
had first presided over the council at Constantinople, as well as for the emperor 
Theodosius’s wife Flacilla and his daughter. More importantly, however, he was charged 
with articulating the orthodox teaching on the Holy Spirit in Pontus – a time in which he 
                                              
14 Life of Macrina, 978. When speaking about the dates for Gregory’s works, it is suitable only to 
speak of ranges of dates or otherwise those times after certain events in his life provided by internal 
evidence in the texts. For a good survey of the studies on the chronology of Gregory’s works, see J. 
Danielou, “La Chronologie des oeuvres de Gregoire de Nysse” Studia Patristica 7 (1996): 159-169; s.v. 
“Chronology of Works” in Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco and Guilio Maspero, eds., Brill Dictionary of 
Gregory of Nyssa, Seth Cherney, trans. (Leiden: Brill, 2010): 153-169.  
 
15 Helladius, successor to Basil in Caesarea and Gregory, bishop of Nyssa, are included in a list of 
those bishops whom should be considered the defenders of the Nicene faith that emerged dominant. “The 
emperor was personally acquainted with all these bishops, and had ascertained that they governed their 
respective churches wisely and piously.” Sozomen Hermias, Ecclesiastical History, 382. 
 
16 “For the Church once being divided, rested not in that schism, but the separatists taking 
occasion from the slightest and most frivolous pretences, disagreed among themselves.” Socrates 
Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, 128. 
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either formulated, or likely, committed finally to writing, his treatise on the subject.17 In 
the period following his final refutation of Eunomius, who stood before the emperor 
Theodosius for judgement in 383, Gregory composed his most poignant works describing 
the spiritual life: the Life of Moses and his Homilies on the Song of Songs. Sometime in 
the 390s Gregory passed away leaving a great theological legacy to be upheld by the 
following generation of Christians – particularly as the controversies surrounding the 
human and divine natures of Christ began to come to the fore. Many valued his position 
on the doctrine of the Trinity and his anti-Eunomian polemic, but the influence of 
Neoplatonism on his theology was clear. In the final years of the fourth and opening 
years of the fifth century, controversy surrounding the theology of Origen erupted. 
Because Gregory employed Platonic language and taught on controversial topics in a 
manner like Origen (as will be seen in the later discussion of hope for universal salvation 
and the nature of the resurrection), his theology came under scrutiny within the church. 
However, his work survived the tests of the time, and continued to exercise influence on 
later Greek fathers such as Pseudo-Dionysius and Gregory Palamas.  
Just as Gregory’s theology proper emerges from the ecclesiastical and political 
context of his time, his anthropology develops as a reflection of his convictions about the 
nature of God. This extended survey of Gregory’s work will introduce first those 
elements which became the touchstones for Gregory’s teaching about God - namely his 
doctrines of divine infinity, incomprehensibility, and unity of essence and energies – and 
then observe out the features of Gregory’s anthropology. The span of his inquiry, as with 
any work delving into the meaning behind the terms “divine” or “human” nature, is 
                                              
17 Meredith, The Cappadocians, 54. Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, 4-5. 
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expansive, covering the whole of human experience: from the nature of imagehood, the 
understanding of sexuality, the composition of the human being, and many other topics 
beyond these. It is, however, under the lens of the divine nature that Gregory hoped to 
bring into focus the nature of humanity as intended by God, as restored by God, and now 
living with God. 
A Vision of God 
The hallmark of pro-Nicene theology, including Gregory’s, is the belief that there 
is only one divine nature, one God, at work: 
But in the case of the Divine nature we do not similarly learn that the 
Father does anything by Himself in which the Son does not work 
conjointly, or again that the Son has any special operation apart from the 
Holy Spirit;18  
Qualifying this affirmation, however, is the belief that the Godhead is indeed 
differentiated into three Persons: 
we regard it [the Godhead] as consummately perfect and 
incomprehensibly excellent yet as containing clear distinctions within 
itself which reside in the peculiarities of each of the Persons: as possessing 
invariableness by virtue of its common attribute of uncreatedness, but 
differentiated by the unique character of each Person.19  
This is the legacy of Nicaea expressed by Gregory. Individual pro-Nicene 
theologians might be said to have different points of origin, and either emphasize (or 
present logically first) either the unity or the diversity in the Godhead, but it is true that, 
as with Gregory’s distinction of the divine Persons above, these beliefs are the common 
attributes of their vision of God.20  
                                              
18 Gregory of Nyssa, On not three gods, 334.  
 
19 Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, 61. 
 
20 As well as pro-Nicene theologians of the traditional East and West who, in the words of Lewis 
Ayers, should rightly be considered together despite the “categories of division.” Ayres, 278-301. Gregory 
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Nevertheless, there are distinctions beyond these that characterized Gregory’s 
conception of God.21 Gregory’s unique character is most eminent in his expression of 
divine infinity, his insistence that the essence - the divine nature - is ultimately 
unknowable, and his conception of the divine essences and energies. Gregory employs 
each of these principles in turn to preserve the foundational truth of the Christian faith –
communion with the triune God.  
The doctrine of divine infinity, perhaps above all other facets of Gregory’s 
theology, appears as the expression of Gregory’s desire to maintain the separation 
between creature and Creator. Meredith points out that the creature-Creator divide, along 
with Nyssen’s claims about divine infinity, are likely resultant from the polemical context 
of his early writings.22 His distinction between the creature and the Creator was the 
essential point of departure for Anomoeans and neo-Arians, who believed in a 
dissimilarity, albeit a homoiousios likeness (if not a hetero otherness), between the Son 
and the Father.23 Eunomius contended that the difference in their natures centered around 
the Son’s status as Begotten, which implied a divergence from the Ungenerate and 
Unbegotten nature of God.24 For the Eunomian party, the essential oneness and simplicity 
of the divine nature – to which Gregory also subscribed – necessitated the Father’s 
                                              
himself seeks to balance in his own thought the concepts of diversity and unity in his opening statements in 
The great catechism, lest “in [one’s] contention with the Greeks [they sink] to the level of Judaism” (473).  
 
21 This is by no means intended to indicate that Gregory was the first nor the only champion of 
these ideas about God – these traits are those most often emphasized by Gregory in his writing. 
 
22 Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, 13-14. 
 
23 Against Eunomius, 56. “The whole controversy, then, between the Church and the Anomoeans 
turns on this: Are we to regard the Son and the Holy Spirit as belonging to created or uncreated existence?” 
 
24 Ayers, 146-147. 
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Ungenerate character to be the only divine characteristic, as well as being his alone.25 
Therefore, the Son and the Father could both be spoken of in human language in a 
manner embodying their essence: the Father as Unbegotten and the Son as Begotten, and, 
therefore, a creature.26  
Gregory, responding in his polemical treatises, finds this manipulation of the 
essential categories of creature and Creator untenable. For Nyssen, the Creator is the 
ultimate ground of being. The creature, by contrast, exists only in relation to and by 
participation in God, whose nature possesses being.27 Thus far, both Gregory and his 
Eunomian opponents might yet agree: after all, the Begotten nature of the Son could be 
said to embody a nominal relation and yet be one of creature and Creator. Gregory points 
out, however, that the recognition of God as being one ought to logically rule out the 
Anomoean distinction between the two persons, Begotten and Unbegotten as senior 
() and junior () beings.28 Eunomius speaks of the Father as the 
“Supreme and Absolute Being,” in contrast to the Son – “another existing through it, but 
after it.”29 Eunomius and his followers claimed to still worship the Son as God, but not as 
                                              
25 Harold Cherniss, The Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1930): 36-37. 
 
26 Hans Boersma, Embodiment and Virtue in Gregory of Nyssa: an anagogical approach (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2013): 24-25; 54-55. 
 
27 Han Urs von Balthasar, Presence and Thought: Essay on the Religious Philosophy of Gregory 
of Nyssa, “The Concept of Spacing” (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1995): 1-5. Cherniss, 35. Life of 
Moses, 13. The great catechism, 498.  
 
28 Ayers, 146-149. Aëtius, Eunomius, and others also tend towards the usage of other names for 
the Father and the Son, including the pairing “generate” and “ingenerate” first used by Arius in his Thalia. 
When the language of Sonship is used, it is to press further the notion of Christ being “generate” of the 
Father and implying an inherent subordinationism.  
 
29 Against Eunomius, 50. 
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the Supreme Being. In doing so, however, Eunomius inevitably draws a distinction based 
on a measure of some kind, which Gregory characterizes as “spacing,” or diastema, 
between the Father and the Son. Some form of positioning would have to be considered, 
then deemed correct, and measured between these two immaterial Beings.30  
In response Gregory draws together analogies comparing the length of two reeds, 
or, in other places, the comparison of the height at two points on a hill, explaining that 
Eunomius considers “the supreme from that which is below, and assigning to the Father 
as it were the peak of some hill, while he seats the Son lower down in the hollows.” In 
speaking this way Gregory points out the absurdity of the comparison. Gregory asks 
where the reed measuring the depths of the nature of the Father might end, and how much 
it might exceed the length of the Son’s – or, likewise, how high the hill might be to mark 
the divine nature in excess of the nature of the Son. “We get the idea of excess,” Gregory 
remarks, “only by a comparison of limits: where there is no limit, we cannot think of any 
excess.”31 Regardless of the analogy used and despite the substitution of any pairing of 
names, the concept of using a measure to designate the two breaches the defined 
principles surrounding Divinity. In other words, Nyssen claimed that it is the creature that 
consisted in this realm of the interval, or diastema, rather than God due to the fact that it 
was not the Creator.32 This distinction of interval, or spacing, was the key for keeping 
separate the created and the divine. 
                                              
30 Against Eunomius, 209. 
 
31 Against Eunomius, 51-52. 
 
32 Balthasar, 3. Indeed, it is Gregory’s contention that any comparison between creature and 
Creator is inappropriate and impossible. Therefore, he is similarly unimpressed with arguments that, 
instead of comparing the Son and the Father as measures, compare the infinity God with creation itself to 
determine the Divine nature. Boersma, 24-25; 42. 
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Gregory consistently argues that the concept of spacing, measure (diastema), or 
positioning cannot be applied to uncreated Being. Within God there is no movement, 
alteration, passion, and certainly no measure in the sense of the categories of time, space, 
and quality perceived by created beings whether “in the distinction between his Persons, 
or his nature as such.”33 For God, nothing “is as past or future,”34 and the concept of 
spatial position is a “property of the material: but the intellectual and immaterial is 
confessedly removed from the idea of locality.”35 The Godhead should be “contemplated 
apart from these conditions,” and “is free from the circumscription which is formed by 
such categories.”36 As God has possession of being he transcends these concepts, and the 
creature is, in itself, embodied within this concept of spacing by its nature. The creature is 
itself non-being in essence, which came as called into existence by divine purpose.37  
Despite Gregory’s reticence to elaborate on knowledge of the Godhead by placing 
it beyond descriptive conception he does not restrict his understanding of the Holy 
Trinity to utter passivity. He instead limits his expression to those concepts which 
preserve for him the essential divide between creature and Creator. The Anomoean desire 
to give expression to transcendent Deity led to the nominal conventions mentioned above 
                                              
33 Balthasar, 5. 
 
34 On the making of man, 405. 
 
35 Against Eunomius, 51. Later, it will be shown that Gregory distinguishes also between created 
and uncreated spiritual and intellectual beings.  
 
36 On not three gods, 335. Balthasar is sure to warn against the confounding of space and time 
particularly with the concept of diastema (5-11). While the adiastematic nature of God includes being 
without temporal and spatial limitation God also is exempt of all manner of measure. Later the concept of 
diastema as it relates to intelligible creation will clarify the way something can be free from measure to a 
certain extent but yet be on created side of the divide between creature and Creator.  
 
37 On the making of man, 405. Balthasar, 5. 
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and in his letter to Ablabius. Gregory affirms the trouble in this desire to give a name to 
that which is “above every name.” He acknowledges that even the term “Godhead” is a 
name that imposes bounds of some sort; but “in order then to mark the constancy of our 
conception of infinity in the case of the divine nature, we say that the Deity is above 
every name.”38 Use of divine names is only permissible in this context of epistemic 
humility. In a way similar to the reticent and apophatic expression of Plato in the 
Symposium and the Phaedrus, Gregory writes in order to keep the nature of God 
unbounded by any opposites.39  Leaving aside grasping about for the divine nature, 
Nyssen points instead to the names of God only as an approach to what has been 
revealed. The permissibility of using names like “Godhead,” “Father,” and “Son” is that, 
unlike “Supreme Being” and the “other,” these terms denote a comparison based on 
personality and relationship rather than establishing interval between the Persons of the 
Godhead.  
Gregory’s claims about divine infinity lead to the necessary conclusion that the 
unlimited nature of the Godhead is beyond the finite scope of human understanding.40 If 
God in his essence is unlimited Goodness, then the demonstrable human inability to 
comprehend God is self-evident. Eunomius’s attempt to wholly define the nature of God 
as being Unbegotten is one of the chief reasons for Gregory’s elaboration on divine 
infinity. Rather than speak directly of the divine nature, Gregory remarks that “no 
consideration will be given to anything enclosing infinite nature. It is not in the nature of 
                                              
38 On not three gods, 335. Tamsin Jones Farmer, “Revealing the Invisible: Gregory of Nyssa on 
the gift of revelation” Modern Theology 21.1 (January, 2005): 72. 
 
39 Cherniss, 35; As Cherniss records, “whatever God’s nature really is.”  
 
40 Andrew P. Klager “Free will and vicinal culpability in St. Gregory of Nyssa’s De Vita Moysis” 
Greek Orthodox Theological Review 55.1-4 (2010): 156. 
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what is unenclosed to be grasped.”41 When Nyssen does speak of the Godhead, however, 
it is not in such a way as to eliminate any possibility of knowledge, but rather to maintain 
his crucial distinction between creature and Creator.42 A good way of observing both 
Gregory’s apophatic and cataphatic expression in their appropriate tension, then, is his 
description of the theophanies of Exodus which he interprets in his Life of Moses.  
When thinking of theophanic and revelatory language in Christianity, the biblical 
imagery of light comes readily to mind. Most immediately there is the narrative of the 
transfiguration of Christ, in which the veil over the eyes of the apostles Peter, James, and 
John is lifted, and they together gaze upon the brilliant light of Christ’s divine nature. 
Other narratives of divine figures speak about the observer being struck blind, implying a 
sort of brilliance that is also linked to imagery of bright light.43 For Gregory in the Life of 
Moses, however, the Israelite’s perception of God, and particularly Moses’s experience 
with God, proceed in stages of not ever-increasing brilliance and illumination in light, but 
rather into an ascent into what is called a “luminous” but “impenetrable darkness.”44 
Certainly, Gregory does not exclude the typical schema of divine revelation, as shall be 
                                              
41 Life of Moses, 115-116. 
 
42 On the making of man, 390-391. But knowledge of God is “lived and experienced rather than 
objectively understood.” Concerning the mix of cataphatic and apophatic elements, see Philip Kariatlis, 
““Dazzling Darkness”: The Mystical or Theophanic Theology of St. Gregory of Nyssa” Phronema 27.2 
(2012): 99-101. 
 
43 Martin Laird in his chapter “The Luminous Dark Revisited” of Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp 
of Faith: Union, Knowledge, and Divine Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) surveys the 
debate of the origins of Gregory’s mystical darkness theology and its dissimilarity with Neoplatonic 
philosophy; see particularly 174-176. 
 
44 Life of Moses, 94; 134.  
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seen, but concludes with the peak of divine knowledge existing only in those places 
“where the understanding does not reach.”45 
The first theophany is the bright appearance of the burning bush to Moses in the 
foreign land of Midian. Before conceiving of the presence of God in the bush, Moses 
approaches based on the “light brighter than sunlight” which “dazzled his eyes.”46 As 
with all humanity, Moses first becomes aware of the phenomena through his sensible 
understanding. The ascent he begins on this mountain in Midian is his first step out of the 
darkness of ignorance towards knowledge and union with the divine.47 When he 
approaches the bush, his mind is prepared for what he is to see, perhaps in an intellectual 
sense, by the light – the divine light – that shines on him. This stage of ascent into 
knowledge of the divine nature is the first of the three stages of spiritual ascent: 
purification, illumination, and unification.48 This light purifies his mind, his eyes, and out 
                                              
45 Life of Moses, 42. The thrust of Gregory’s apophatic theology, particularly in its expression in 
the Life of Moses, has been debated heavily. Many scholars are drawn to the unique way in which he 
employs the theme of darkness in divine revelation in knowledge (i.e. Danielou’s analysis in Platonisme et 
théologie mystique; see also Kariatlis) and take the powerful paradox of the luminous darkness to be the 
height of Moses’s ascent. Laird considers Gregory’s theological outlook to be as much a theology of light 
as one of darkness, and emphasizes the language of light for the expression of Christian faith. Eubank (see 
below) dwells neither in the themes of light and darkness as the summit, nor as a strict succession. Instead, 
he acknowledges the paradox as it stands and elevates instead Moses’ encounter with the heavenly 
tabernacle. In this view, the apophatic and cataphatic approaches stand together to express the paradoxical 
nature of knowing God, but also express the way in which, as knowledge of God for Gregory is beyond the 
grasp of human understanding, the human experience of God is primarily mediated through sacramental 
realities in a lived faith. “On the contrary, by the use of the analogy of a measurable surface he leads the 
hearer to the unlimited and infinite.” Life of Moses, 116. 
 
46 Life of Moses, 33. 
 
47 Kariatlis, 105-108. Cherniss, 42-43. 
 
48 Nathan Eubank, “Ineffably Effable: The Pinnacle of Mystical Ascent in Gregory of Nyssa’s De 
Vita Moysis” International Journal of Systematic Theology 16.1 (January, 2014): 27-28. Eubank points out 
that these stages, far from being clear and systematic categories in Gregory’s expression, instead run 
together. Gregory speaks of the stages of purification and illumination particularly as being cyclical and 
reciprocal, and, true to the human experience, being the stages in which one spends the majority of life. 
Kariatlis also recognizes the importance of the fluidity of these stages, pointing out that in moral growth, 
virtuous living, and katharsis are not prerequisite of knowledge of God, but initiated by revelation. 
Kariatlis, 107-108. 
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of the light comes a request. Part and parcel of this preparation, Moses is prompted to 
remove the sandals from his feet, and to come to stand “on that ground on which the 
divine light was shining.”49 Gregory records the first revelation that Moses receives of 
God, then, as in a scene filled with light, and of light brilliant enough to dazzle Moses 
and draw him out from the darkness – darkness of ignorance, sin, and error – in which he 
previously dwelt.50   
Having been coaxed from an initial darkness into light, the language of revelation 
then changes to a twofold image of lightness and darkness. Preceding Moses’s ascent into 
the cloud manifest at Sinai, God leads the Israelites in their journey in the form of a 
cloud. Gregory then construes the cloud as an image of darkness as well as the image of 
light – the service of the cloud as being shade by day and light by night. In the two sides 
of the nature of the cloud the notion that “it was something beyond human 
comprehension” is apparent, and later readers learn that Gregory interprets the cloud as 
the Holy Spirit.51 This stage in the ascent, illumination, begins with Moses’s encounter 
with the burning bush, but continues in the Israelites being guided in a way that clearly 
displays divine eminence. Illumination occurs in the freeing of the mind from all 
concepts and notions about God, allowing both Moses and the people of Israel to begin in 
their knowledge of God with the understanding that God is somehow beyond the 
sensible.52  
                                              
49 Life of Moses, 34.  
 
50 Laird, 178.  
 
51 Life of Moses, 37, 81. 
 
52 Kariatlis, 108-109. While Gregory’s doctrine of divine infinity comes temporally prior to his 
writing in the Life of Moses, he is able, through the narrative, to place the understanding of God’s infinite 
 
 
16 
 
Similarly, the image of a “dark cloud” enshrouds Mt. Sinai, with an appearance 
like “a fire shining out of the darkness.”53  As before, the motifs of light and darkness 
appear together indicating the revelatory nature of the appearance, but the theophany can 
still be understood as being beyond the abilities of human comprehension. In this case the 
incomprehensible nature of God is indirectly displayed through the response of the 
people by the sound of blaring trumpets, smoldering flames of light, and impenetrable 
smoke. Moses, elected by the people as a representative due to their fear of the intensity 
of the divine presence, then travels up into this cloud, and goes beyond the sight and 
comprehension of the people.  
Here he enters into “the inner sanctuary of the divine mystical doctrine,” where 
Gregory directly states his convictions about the unknowableness of God:  
While there he received the divine ordinances. These were the teachings 
concerning virtue, the chief of which is reverence and having the proper 
notions about the divine nature, inasmuch as it transcends all cognitive 
thought and representation and cannot be likened to anything which is 
known. He was commanded to heed none of those things comprehended 
by the notions with regard to the divine nor to liken the transcendent 
nature to any of the things known by comprehension. Rather, he should 
believe that the Divine exists, and he should not examine it with respect to 
quality, quantity, origin, and mode of being, since it is unattainable.54  
The process begun in God’s revelation through the burning bush comes to the 
third stage – union – at this point. The notion of darkness may be difficult to understand 
as a positive rather than purely negative statement. Indeed, union may appear 
inappropriate or “unattainable” given the gravity of Gregory’s apophatic language. 
                                              
nature not within these first two steps that have been described, but most apparently in the final stage of 
union and darkness. Meredith, The Cappadocians, 67-68. 
 
53 Life of Moses, 41. 
 
54 Life of Moses, 42. 
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Moses, surrounded by the darkness of divine presence, and the believer, relieved of all 
concepts foreign to the nature of God, dwells in contemplation of God’s divine infinity.55 
That infinity is manifest, however, in God’s revelation of both the law and the plan of the 
tabernacle by “divine power.”56 By these means Moses brought to the people a visible 
reality of the dwelling of God among them, just as when he descends the mountain he 
does so with the clear visible mark of having been in the presence of the invisible God. 
Gregory, in describing these events, yet underscores the transcendence of God beyond 
human sense, but also affirms that “knowing without knowing” and union with God 
could be achieved by divine grace.57 
In response to this doctrine of divine infinity and incomprehensibility, Gregory 
was open to attack by his opponents, who, misunderstanding his narrative of ascent into 
ineffable knowledge claimed he “worshipped what he did not know” (John 4:22).58 
Therefore another way Gregory responded to the problem of tension between divine 
transcendence and immanence was his doctrine concerning the divine essence and 
energies. As will be seen, Gregory believed the energies of God (those revelatory actions 
of God in the cosmos) intimated what could be known about the ultimately unknowable 
essence (what God truly is). While the energies did not fully reveal the divine essence, 
they could not be separated from the Godhead. His expression of the concepts of 
                                              
55 Laird, 177-178. This is a departure from the Platonic understanding of true knowledge, in which 
the realm of the intellect – beyond the human senses – is the place where true knowledge resides and can be 
gained. Gregory’s conviction, however, is that while the intelligible is indeed the realm of true knowledge 
it cannot be known in “any exhaustive sense.” Klager, 156-157. 
 
56 Life of Moses, 42-43. This revelation of the heavenly tabernacle, of course, relates to the 
revelation of God in Christ in the incarnation. Life of Moses, 97. 
 
57 Klager, 163. Kariatlis, 109-112. 
 
58 Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, 14.  
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“essence” and “energy” are not as fully developed as later fathers, such as Maximus the 
Confessor, Pseudo-Dionysius, or, most notably, Gregory Palamas, but Nyssen does 
categorize together the things that can be known (energies) about God: namely the divine 
names, the attributes of God, and divine activity and power.59 
In his letter to Ablabius Gregory addresses the problems inherent in the use of a 
plurality of divine names. As discussed before, Gregory’s intent when using these 
concepts, these names, to describe the nature of God is to validate only those things 
which can be known. Rather than encompassing the divine essence, they contain 
important observations for humans insofar as God relates to the meaning embodied by 
those names. “We fashion,” Gregory says, “our appellations from the several operations 
() that are known to us.”60  Particularly in On not three gods he speaks at length 
on the name Godhead in terms of an objection raised against his Trinitarian thesis: that 
using the term Godhead might indicate that one could speak of three Gods, as one would 
speak of other plural instantiations of being performing the same operation – he uses the 
examples of farmers, or several orators. Indeed, use of the term Godhead tends towards 
the expression of multifaceted unity rather than the nuanced unity in diversity which 
Gregory sought to express. Gregory’s reply, however, is that “the term “Godhead” is 
significant of operation, and not of essence.”61 The triune Godhead in unity performs the 
operation, in this example, of “seeing,” which Gregory links etymologically with the term 
                                              
59 A. Torrance, “Precedents for Palamas’ Essence-Energies Theology in the Cappadocian Fathers” 
Vigiliae Christianae 63.1 (2009): 64-65. Farmer, 72-73. 
 
60 On not three gods, 333. 
 
61 On not three gods, 333.
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Godhead (. This “seeing” is a characteristic which again clarifies God () as 
the Triune one, being the Creator, that “beholds” all in their essence, whereas the 
creature, who is beheld (), is characteristically unable to conceive of the divine 
essence. 
This response is characteristic of Gregory’s distinction between essence and 
activity. When speaking of God, the transcendent nature, or essence, remains untouched 
by human knowledge, but is instead “by its surroundings [the divine nature] is made 
known.” Gregory regards the traditional categories of knowledge about God, such as 
omniscience, omnipresence, immutability, impassibility, or eternality, as “fit to be 
understood or asserted of the divine nature, yet not expressing that which that nature is in 
its essence.”62 These characteristics indicate the presence of certain qualities within the 
divine essence but fall short of encompassing the whole. Nyssen hoped to reassure his 
reader(s) that human knowledge and human speech about God can and should be 
according to those appropriate categories – however, they are only helpful to a certain 
extent, and serve as points in theological orientation rather than wholly constituting the 
divine nature themselves.63 God is known by his energies but is unknowable in his 
essence. 
Despite its conceptual prominence, the precise meaning of God’s energies is 
difficult to determine in Nyssen’s writing. The divine energy must not, as within his 
                                              
62 On not three gods, 332-333. Lewis Ayers, “On Not Three People: The Fundamental Themes of 
Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology as seen in To Ablabius: On not Three Gods” Modern Theology 
18.4 (October, 2002): 455-456. 
 
63 Meredith, The Cappadocians, 59-60. Just as has been indicated before – the chief objection of 
Gregory’s answer to Eunomius’ anti-Nicene conception of the Trinity is his insistence that one of these 
elements can be said to measure the breadth of the divine nature. 
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responses to Eunomius, become understood as a monolithic movement or group of 
characteristics that evoke the same results in all situations. In other words, Gregory’s 
opponents believed that if one can observe a variety of effects stemming from the 
“energies,” or attributes, of the Father, Son, and Spirit, they might indicate a difference in 
essential nature between the three persons. The Father, for example, might be said to 
create by His energy, whereas the Spirit’s life-giving power flows from the energy 
following it.64 Understanding God’s divine operation in this way allows for the 
possibility that differing powers, and therefore differing essences, are at work.  
To counter this thought, Gregory repeatedly expressed the unity of nature in the 
diversity of activity through the analogy of fire.65 Fire, which has heat as part of its 
essential nature, produces differing effects in the case of different material subjects: wood 
burns, mud dries, and metal takes on the heat and luminescence of the flame. Through 
this example of plurality in effect stemming from one power Gregory expressed that, 
although the divine activity does indeed produce different effects, the Father, the Son, 
and the Spirit can be said to share the same power.66 Their activity, rather, is the common 
thread which gives rise to human understanding of the unity of the three divine persons.67 
Gregory describes this unity in what can now be recognized as a fundamental expression 
of Trinitarian thought, that “every operation,” whether in the “seeing” mentioned before, 
                                              
64 Against Eunomius, 54-55. 
 
65 Michel Rene Barnes, The Power of God: in Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology 
(Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2001): 278-286.  
 
66 Michel Rene Barnes, “Eunomius of Cyzicus and Gregory of Nyssa: Two Traditions of 
Transcendent Causality” Vigiliae Christianae 52.1 (1998): 73-79. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Holy Trinity, 
328. 
 
67 Ayers, Nicaea and its Legacy, 354-355. 
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or generally with any divine attribute embodied by the concept of fire above, “has its 
origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy 
Spirit.”68 
 This statement, just as with those that begin this section, is the full-bodied 
expression of Trinitarian theology which appears in each of the Cappadocian fathers. 
While Gregory’s particular emphases of divine infinity, incomprehensibility, and the 
concepts of the divine essence and energies have described the underlying foundation for 
his vision of God, discussion of his theology would be incomplete without considering 
the implications of such a theology. In his On the making of man, Gregory challenges 
Eunomius and others like him: “Let those tell us who consider the nature of God to be 
within their comprehension, whether they understand themselves—if they know the 
nature of their own mind…”69 For Gregory, the task of self-knowledge is one of utmost 
importance – one intimately connected with the human desire to know God. As he writes 
to his brother Peter in the introduction to the treatise, the nature of humanity is his goal. 
Basil had, in his Hexaemeron, explicated a teaching on the creation of the world in the 
eponymous six days, but Gregory, surveying the work his brother had done, desired to 
expound on one facet: the nature of humanity. After all, humanity had been created, as it 
was written, in the image of God. Having qualified some important aspects of Gregory’s 
vision of God, the parallels between his theology and his convictions about anthropology 
can be discussed. 
  
                                              
68 On not three gods, 334. On the Holy Trinity, 329. 
 
69 On the making of man, 395. 
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Perceiving Humanity 
The scope of our proposed enquiry is not small: it is second to none of the 
wonders of the world,—perhaps even greater than any of those known to 
us, because no other existing thing, save the human creation, has been 
made like to God…70 
Gregory introduced the concerns he wished to address in On the making of man 
with this paradigmatic statement on his theology of humanity. For Gregory, the notion of 
humanity created in the image of God was the touchstone for his discussion of any of the 
individual concerns which he afterwards laid out. In On the making of man Nyssen 
discussed, in light of humanity’s creation in the image of God, the origin and nature of 
human gender and sexuality, the relation of the corporeal to the intellectual, the 
composition of the human body and soul, and ultimately would give description to the 
expansive concept of human imagehood. While Gregory’s theological anthropology 
certainly extends beyond the bounds of his expression in On the making of man, the 
essential core of his ideas can be grasped from within this oeuvre. Therefore, the purport 
of this paper – in appropriately loose fashion – is to follow the conceptual structure which 
Gregory established in the preface to explore the connections between the three emphases 
of his theology (infinity, incomprehensibility, and the essence-energy distinction) to his 
anthropology. In discussing humanity as created in the image of God, Nyssen wrote with 
these three categories in mind: “that which we believe [humanity] to be,” “that which is 
expected to appear afterwards,” and “that which is now seen”.71  
                                              
70 On the making of man, 386.  
 
71 On the making of man, 386. 
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order from the translation in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers – rather than proceeding: “what was, what is, 
and what will be,” the order goes from “what was, what will be, and what is” revealing the essential 
eschatological nature of Gregory’s anthropology. 
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“That which we believe [humanity] to be”; Imagehood and Psychosomatic Union 
 Nyssen was certainly not the first of the church fathers to take on the challenge of 
writing about the human condition. Much less was he the first to propose definitions and 
meanings for the enigmatic but deeply significant idea that God created humanity in his 
image. From Irenaeus to Origen and the Alexandrines, and many in between, this area of 
theology had been deeply concerning to early Christians.72 The chief way in which 
Gregory interacted with this rich tradition was his distinction between two terms 
commonly used in anthropological discussions: that of imagehood and likeness.  
 Gregory believed that human imagehood was most imminently manifest in the 
exceptional human faculty for rational and discursive thought. The “faculty of thought 
and reason is incommunicable, and is a peculiar gift in our nature, to be considered by 
itself… That alone, the choice product, as has been said, of all our life, bears the stamp of 
the Divine character.”73 Humanity, among all the rest of creation, had been designated 
with the higher capacity for reason, and because of the other elements of human nature 
(which, as shall be seen, humanity shared with other parts of creation) Gregory meant to 
distinguish it from all else in the sense that humans were sui generis stamped with the 
divine image. It is important, however, to understand that the peculiarity of the divine 
image in humanity did not exist separately from the rest of human nature. In a manner 
like his description of the divine essence and energies, Gregory believed that “the image 
                                              
72 For a good overview giving a consensus view of the Greek fathers (Gregory and the other 
Cappadocians included), see Zachary C. Xintaras, “Man – the Image of God: According to the Greek 
Fathers” Greek Orthodox Theological Review 1.1 (August, 1954): 48-62. Young notes that the idea of 
humanity created in the image of God goes at least back to Plato’s discussion in the Theaetetus. Frances M. 
Young, “Adam and Anthropos: A Study of the Interaction of Science and the Bible in Two Anthropological 
Treatises of the Fourth Century” Vigiliae Christianae 37.2 (1983): 119.  
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is not in part of our nature.”74 The image of God in humanity extended over all other 
elements and was inseparable from them, drawing them alike up to God.  Furthermore, 
Nyssen did not consider the image of God to be limited to only its operation in the 
rational faculty, but instead was a plenary expression of a manifold gift.  
The perfect form of goodness is here to be seen by His both bringing man 
into being from nothing, and fully supplying him with all good gifts: but 
since the list of individual good gifts is a long one, it is out of the question 
to apprehend it numerically. The language of Scripture therefore expresses 
it concisely by a comprehensive phrase, in saying that man was made “in 
the image of God”: for this is the same as to say that He made human 
nature participant in all good; for if the Deity is the fulness of good, and 
this is His image, then the image finds its resemblance to the Archetype in 
being filled with all good.75  
 Beginning here one can begin to sense the distinction which Gregory makes 
between the intrinsic image-bearing nature of humanity and the resemblance that can be 
(or may not be) seen in accordance with the Archetype. Gregory often spoke in this way 
about human resemblance, or likeness, to God as an extension of his convictions about 
human virtue and behavior. As above, Gregory believed God to be the fulness of 
Goodness, and human goodness to be that resemblance of the ultimate. In some way, 
Gregory needed to trace “out the truth so far as [humans] are capable by conjectures and 
inferences” of the freedom inherent within human nature, which bred its “pitiable 
suffering,” with the “blessedness of the impassible Life.”76 Therefore, it is also important, 
                                              
74 On the making of man, 405. He also makes certain to emphasize that, although the image is 
manifest in humanity according to a plurality of means and a variety of persons, that the image of God in 
humanity is yet unified. That is, just as the Triune God has a unified nature, so with humanity. For an 
example of Nyssen’s use of imagehood as analogous for the trinitarian sense of diversified unity, see On 
the making of man, 391.  
 
75 On the making of man, 404. He also refers to the plurality of virtues by use of an analogy of 
color – neither mixed and indistinct nor separately existent as parts. Instead, the “manifold” and “varied” 
hues helped “to form in men the likeness of God: with such hues as these did the Maker of His own image 
mark our nature.” On the making of man, 390. 
 
76 On the making of man, 403. 
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in considering Gregory’s understanding of human likeness, to consider his emphasis on 
the freedom of human will and the language of human participation in the divine. 
Gregory understood humanity’s possession of free will as paramount to its image-
bearing nature. In achieving virtue and likeness to God, humanity works in a 
cooperational sense, in synergy with God.77 Gregory’s Homilies on the Beatitudes reveal 
the nature of this process in his thought. Through God’s work in Christ, the grace of 
baptism, and the labor of prayer both elements of grace and human effort are present.78 
One might say that God’s work in the incarnation restates the divine work in creation: 
both establish the divine image for the ongoing work of humanity to incarnate Christ. In 
other words, God works to recreate the human in his image, for “that which was made ‘in 
the image’ is one thing, and that which is now manifested in wretchedness is another.”79 
In order to restore the likeness of humanity to the gracious height afforded by their 
creation in the image of God, humans needed to exercise their will to conform to the 
example presented in the life of Christ. 
The human capacity for choice laid open the possibility of participation in the 
divine image. As Susan Wessel points out, Gregory differed from other church fathers by 
his implication that within the soul and the mind, the locus of the divine image, lay an 
intrinsic virtuous nature that existed apart from the notion of moral effort and free will.80 
                                              
77 Life of Moses, 81-82. “Now this is the will, a thing that cannot be enslaved, and of self-
determining power, since it is seated in the liberty of thought and mind.” The great catechism, 496. 
 
78 Rebekah Eklund, “Blessed are the Image-bearers: Gregory of Nyssa and the Beatitudes” 
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79 On the making of man, 404. 
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Despite the blemishes and afflictions that dimmed the appearance of the image in 
humanity, the capacity for likeness afforded by being “stamped” with the image 
remained. The intrinsic goodness within humanity was part of humanity’s freedom “from 
necessity,” but Nyssen also felt that he needed also to express that “virtue is a voluntary 
thing.”81 In this way Gregory’s thought was contiguous with his brother in making the 
distinction between imagehood and likeness. Basil similarly drew his distinction between 
the image and likeness of God in humanity by speaking in the Aristotelian terms of  
dunamis (power) and energiea (energy).  Whereas humanity had been created in the 
image of God the manner of human likeness to God is dependent on their capacity – 
ability – to exercise their will and effort to participate in God’s energies.82 This 
conceptual divide fits with Gregory’s understanding of humanity’s telos to grow 
infinitely in desire for God. Humanity received in the garden a nature according to the 
divine image, but divine likeness is the fulfillment of humanity’s epektatic (eternally 
progressive) struggle – to “be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect.” Aghiorgoussis 
explains that, for Basil, the image of God is an ontological reality, whereas the likeness is 
that ethical calling of which it is humanity’s “purpose to achieve.”83 The image of God in 
humanity provides then, the basis on which humans can grow into the likeness of God. 
The Life of Moses presents an excellent opportunity for Gregory to flesh out his 
conception of human free will. Not only does Moses, the central character, have to 
                                              
81 On the making of man, 404. 
 
82 Aghiorgoussis, 272-273. Klager, 157.  
 
83 Maximos Aghiorgoussis, ““Applications of the Theme of “Eikon Theou” (Image of God) 
according to Saint Basil the Great” The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 21.3 (Fall, 1976): 276. Smith, 
221. Eklund, 734-735. 
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exercise his own will in order to overcome his own hesitancy to fulfill the divine 
commands, but it also includes the troublesome concept of God’s hardening of Pharaoh’s 
heart. At the beginning of our spiritual lives Gregory wrote that one becomes “in some 
manner [their] own parents” by choices “moulding ourselves to the teaching of virtue or 
vice.”84 Yet again, this exercise is contingent upon the possession of “rational faculties” 
that are the “parents” of human virtue, or likeness.85 The thrust of Gregory’s 
hermeneutical effort, then, was to preserve the cooperation of human will with divine 
will. Even in the case of Moses’s encounter with God, divine presence effected but did 
not necessitate his response. Instead, Gregory observes, humanity must apply themselves 
“in quietness to higher philosophical matters over a long period of time” to perceive the 
truth and have a right understanding of God.86 Moses, called and cleansed by the light, 
had to participate in the freeing of his mind of the false conceptions about God. Only 
afterwards did he return to Egypt. As for Pharaoh and the Egyptians, Gregory’s intention 
is to repeatedly defend against the ideas of divine coercion and retribution. Pharaoh 
experiences a hardening of his heart by God’s permission, his handing him over to his 
desires (vis. Rom. 1:21-25), rather than forcing upon him action foreign to his will.87 If 
the passions impose upon human will something foreign to its nature, the question 
                                              
84 Life of Moses, 54-55. 
 
85 Life of Moses, 55. 
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87 Life of Moses, 69-83. Gregory cogently argues against the idea that God might “forcibly draw 
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becomes where, without coercion, human desire to choose the good comes. As Klager 
remarks, for Gregory this is a “great mystery.”88   
Because Gregory has much to say about growth in virtue, in likeness, and 
participation in divine goodness it might seem that Gregory has a high view of human 
capability to choose the good by the exercise of the free will. His view of human creation, 
and divine forethought, however, reveal a starkly different picture.89 In his treatise On the 
making of man, Gregory discussed the narrative of creation and said humanity, from its 
inception, has an essential mutability. Inherent in creation is a movement from non-being 
into being, so that from the beginning humanity existed in a state of change.90 In part this 
observation is to draw out the distinction of humanity as a creature and God as the 
creator, but it also serves as a paradigm for how Gregory intended to present the nature of 
the image of God and the Fall of humanity. Therefore, as Andrew Klager surmises, “the 
freedom of the will implies vulnerability and inevitable failure,” and is a divine plant to 
allow “at least the prospect of emancipation from the tyranny of death” by creating a 
“susceptibility to progress in virtue.”91 Although the chance for human will to achieve 
moral progress on its own power leads to inevitable failure, the freedom of the will leaves 
open the possibility of change – by cooperation with God’s grace – and capacity to 
choose the good.  
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Following in this synergistic pattern, Gregory understood human beings as a 
composite lying in the middle of the divide between creature and Creator. Gregory 
mentioned this blending, this mixis, at the outset of On the making of man, establishing 
early on the broad scope of what it meant to be a human person. Created last, humanity 
had “as foundations the instincts of a twofold organization, [a] blending [of] the Divine 
with the earthy.”92 In order to understand Gregory’s meaning when referring to humanity, 
it is important to recognize that Nyssen never considered the intellectual elements of a 
human as ever existent apart from the sensible parts. As J. Warren Smith affirms, the 
“psychosomatic unity of the person proves central to Nyssen’s anthropology.”93  
Gregory succinctly defined a soul in On the soul and resurrection as “a created, 
living, intellectual being” with the power, if it is provided with organs, of sensuous 
perception.94 Within the soul, however, Gregory distinguished between the parts which 
related to the various faculties of the human intellect. The soul in Greek philosophy had 
long been considered to have divisions determined by the kind of functions that were 
overseen by that part. Aristotelian psychology bifurcated the soul into the rational (logon 
echon) and non-rational (alogon) parts, each with their own subdivisions. Platonic 
psychology, on the other hand, divided the soul into three parts: the rational (logistikon), 
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the spirited (thumoeides), and the appetitive (epithumetikon). Eventually, these traditions 
grew together, and the tripartite division was yet acknowledged by many, but they were 
interpreted according to a bipartition of the rational and non-rational.95 In Gregory’s 
psychology the evidence of these traditions – and their merging – is apparent.  In On the 
making of man, Gregory spoke in a tripartite sense, where the three parts of the soul he 
mentioned were the vegetative (nutritive), animalic (sensible), and rational (intellectual). 
Each of these three parts, not to be seen as a “welding” together of three souls, participate 
in a unity with one another, each building on the next to create a comprehensive image.96 
Using the same rationale as before with the incomprehensible Trinitarian nature of God, 
Gregory advises his reader(s) not to consider the three aspects of the soul as separate as 
the ultimately intellectual nature of the soul negates the possibility of conceiving of the 
three with their own “limits”.97 Rather, these aspects ought to be considered as consisting 
with one another as a unity. The nutritive soul, responsible for growth and support of the 
body, is added on to the sensible soul, which adds sense perception to the vegetative vital 
force. Finally, the rational soul perched atop the other two is the foundation of “perfect 
                                              
95 For discussion of the nature of soul-division in the Platonic philosophy of which Gregory was 
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bodily life,” and adds the capacity to partake in reason.98 These three together also stand 
as a sort of model for the creative narrative for Gregory, wherein the order of life 
introduced to the world proceeds in a similar fashion: first the plants, then the animals, 
and, lastly, the creation of intellectually endowed humanity. Practically, however, his 
language regarding the soul was often according to the bipartative model. In a manner 
similar to the logon echon and alogon distinction, Gregory explains that animals and 
plants, although having the appearance of ensoulment, lack souls in the true sense. True 
and actual ensoulment requires intellectual rational capability.99 This truer sense of the 
soul is that which Gregory speaks of as being the locus of the image and likeness of God: 
within the intellectual tier of the soul which is “unchangeable” by its immaterial 
nature.100 The two lower tiers of the soul, or non-rational levels, relate most directly the 
human senses which facilitate human embodiment. These two tiers allow for the body to 
“partake of the animating power” of the soul, and thereby “move by way of growth.” The 
connection made in these tiers, if severed, removes from the body the “vital energy,” and 
is itself death. Lastly, it is good to again affirm that, rather than being two souls (or even 
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is that of life as intended in creation.  
 
99 On the making of man, 402-403. 
 
100 On the making of man, 417-418. The connection of the three tiers, along with Gregory’s 
doctrine of unity presents a complex issue of whether Gregory truly considers these tiers to be only 
practically part of the soul, or essentially a part of the human soul. See Cherniss, 13-15. Young argues that 
the nutritive tier of the soul will continue in the resurrection life. Although not in the sense of needing to eat 
in order to subsist, Young argues that Gregory speaks in the scriptural sense of the need for spiritual 
nourishment. In On the making of man, Gregory alludes to the fact that the human senses (and thus the 
sensible tier) are “references to models in Himself.” In the same sense as the “knowable unknowable” 
portrayed in The Life of Moses, there are analogs in the divine nature to the sensible human experience 
(Gregory relates them to divine omniscience), but yet God is certainly beyond being “in touch with existing 
things in a manner resembling human operation.”  On the making of man, 390-391. As will be seen, 
Gregory’s discussion of the passions and virtues in human life also has a bearing on this debate.   
 
 
 
32 
 
parts), Gregory considers these tiers which practically relate to the rational and non-
rational faculties distinctives to be united in a single intellectual entity: “the true and 
perfect soul is naturally one.”101 
Rather than entirely subscribing to either of these views, however, Gregory’s 
discussion of the soul must be considered uniquely Christian. There is some continuity, 
but the tradition of the Christian community brings nuance to Gregory’s expression. 
While Nyssen affirms the Platonic immortality of the soul, he does not affirm its 
preexistence apart from the body. The soul’s immortality goes together with the doctrine 
of the resurrection - the Christian hope that the soul with the body will rise again. 
Platonic thought, by contrast, viewed the separation of body and soul at death to be the 
final liberation from a composite form of existence into intelligible simplicity. The 
extension of existence as a “psychosomatic whole” would amount to the prolonging of 
the “estranged state” of the soul in its “earthly condition.” 102  
Indeed, the formal structure and genre of On the soul and the resurrection 
displays the use of Platonic thought on the soul (logos peri psyches) and the salient nature 
of the church’s doctrine in Nyssen’s teaching concerning the resurrection. Macrina stands 
in as the sage teacher of the wisdom of the church, and Gregory, afflicted with passion 
and grief, comes to bring the standard objections of the pagan philosophers. As with the 
concept of measure (diastema) mentioned before, Macrina brings to Gregory’s attention 
the teaching that, likewise, the soul is without measure in terms of “spatial 
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dimensionality.”103 The basic assumption to overcome is the materiality of the soul (as 
well as the contrary: if the soul is not material in nature, then it has no existence).104 Here 
Gregory makes an important connection between his theology and his understanding of 
the human soul. Although not in the same sense, Gregory considered the human mind to 
be like God in its sensible, intelligible, and rational character. Whereas God by his nature 
is unmeasurable by any standard, the intelligible part of humanity – the soul – is 
unbounded by sensible quality, as well as from operation over through certain organ or 
space. Just as in Neoplatonic thought the soul exists in accordance with the analogy of 
light: it “illuminates everything without losing anything itself.”105 That is, it operates over 
the whole body without being bound by its material nature. Added to this is the soul’s 
simplicity and its uncompounded nature, which effectively mirror the unified nature of 
the divine essence.  
It is important to clarify here that the analogous relation between the divine nature 
and the soul only goes so far in Gregory’s thought. He is quick to remind his reader(s) 
that, although the soul is that “which our senses [do not] perceive, neither a colour, nor a 
form, nor a hardness, nor a weight, nor a quantity, nor a cubic dimension, nor a point, nor 
anything else perceptible in matter;”106 in a manner much like the adiastematic nature of 
God, that the soul has  
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its own peculiar nature [that] is something different from that other [that 
is, the divine nature]. Indeed, it would be no longer an “image,” if it were 
altogether identical with that other;107 
Gregory’s view, over and against the Stoic and Epicurean view, is more similar to 
Neoplatonic thought.108 The Stoics regarded the soul as being material, since there could 
not be interaction between a material and immaterial substance.109 The Neoplatonic view 
was that all creation exists as an extension from God, who is, as stated earlier, the 
ultimate ground of being.110 Gregory, in similar fashion, regarded 
the Divine being… [as] distinctly something other than visible and 
material substances, [and] nevertheless pervades each one amongst all 
existences, and by this penetration of the whole keeps the world in a state 
of being.111 
God, however, is not within the being or substance of creation. Rather God is as 
the soul to the body – presiding over and connected to the whole, but not contained 
within any part of it. Gregory relates this idea through Macrina’s voice in On the soul and 
resurrection.112 She explains, directly stating that she is borrowing the concept, that the 
philosophers have proposed the idea of the human being as a microcosmic representation 
of the greater kosmos.113 Just as God is over creation, so the soul with humanity.  
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Perhaps the most explicit manifestation of the essential distinction and essential 
unity of the sensible and intelligible in Gregory’s thought is his proposition of a via tertia 
in the medical debate between the Stoic, Aristotelian, and materialist on the location of 
the hegenomikon (the ruling principle) and the operation of sense perception. In his 
discussion of the human body Gregory employed the terminology and language of Greek 
science to describe its function and abilities. Particularly, the concepts of the philosophic 
schools and medical diction of Galen shaped the form of Gregory’s discourse, providing 
the terms on which Gregory would build to connect his vision of God to those traditional 
anthropological debates. For example, Stoic philosopher Chryssippus of Soli held that 
sensation occurred as pneumatic emanation struck the sense organs (), causing a 
physical reaction-response.114 In a manner similar to Gregory’s theological vision of 
human participation in the divine energies, the human being also had by nature an 
aesthetic, or perceptive sense through its participation in the body. The divine energies 
pointed towards God’s ontological nature in virtue, and the human energy of  
encompassed human perceptive activity, which pointed towards the materiality within 
their nature.115 Human persons participated in the body’s activity through the sensible 
capacity stemming from the sense organs, the vehicles of the mind’s engagement with the 
sensible world. This participation of the body with the soul, for Gregory, pointed again to 
the psychosomatic unity within human nature, as “neither is there perception without 
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material substance, nor does the act of perception take place without the intellectual 
faculty.”116  
Gregory also shared Galen’s notion that the human mind (although he disagreed 
about its material nature) interfaced with the sensible organs, as well as the Stoic’s 
definition of human perception as the “activity of receiving sensory information.”117 The 
open question that lie between these schools and thinkers, however, was where the vital 
and operative force resided within the body. The materialist position was that the vital 
force physically operated from the brain, which Gregory calls the “citadel of the body.” 
The common Stoic and Aristotelian position, on the other hand, believed the 
hegenomikon to reside in the heart, perhaps due to “its middle position in the body.”118 In 
both cases, the arguments for each are based on the observable effect which those parts 
have on the condition of the body and its operation (energia). If the head suffered injury 
there was definite effect on the body’s function. Therefore, philosophers like Galen, 
Plato, and Cicero argued on the basis of the correlation between cause and effect that the 
cerebral membrane must be the container for the (prohaeresis) “choosing faculty.”119 
Likewise, the passionate nature of humanity seemed to flow out of the central space of 
the heart to animate the whole body. More than that, the heart’s centrality made it a 
plausible location because the two other divisions in the soul, as in the understanding of 
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Aristotelians like Alexander of Aphrodesias, were nearby.120 The moisture and heat of the 
body were gathered in towards this center, and therefore, alongside the passionate and 
nutritive part, the rational part which contained the hegenomikon resided there also. 
Gregory both affirms these observations and postulates his own theory. Instead of 
relying on a single source for his understanding, Gregory couched his argument between 
the observations of natural philosophy, his apophatic principles, and the scriptural 
witness.121 By relying on what he has become aware through “those who spend their time 
on anatomical researches” he concurs that the “cerebral membrane… forms a foundation 
for the senses” and that the “heart is a sort of source of the fiery element of the body” 
which corresponds with the passions. “Yet,” Gregory maintained, “I do not hold this for a 
proof that the incorporeal nature is bounded by any limits of place.”122 Because the 
functions and observable pathologies of the body do not directly correspond solely to 
these parts (which to illustrate Nyssen included a detailed discussion of the operation of 
laughter), Gregory instead proposed that the principal authority exists with the 
incorporeal mind (nous). The whole of “our bodily organization” is “equally in contact 
with each of the parts according to a kind of combination which is indescribable.”123 
Again, what Gregory hoped to avoid was the notion that the human mind had a corporeal 
nature, but that the hegenomikon existed beyond the diastemic category of spatial 
limitation.  
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In order to illustrate his understanding of the communication of the intelligible 
mind (nous) and the variety of human senses Gregory proposed the function of a city. 
The gates in this analogy are the various ways in which information comes in contact 
with the body, and therefore the mind. The sense organs, open to a great variety of 
“strangers” and other things that are “mutually unknown,” impart to the body the 
differing means by which humans conceptualize qualities associated with outside 
objects.124 In this way Gregory also maintained that the ability to collate together this 
information into rational concepts indicated intellectual simplicity, rather than implying a 
plurality of “minds” because of the plurality of senses. Just as the multiplicity of divine 
attributes did not upset the divine simplicity, neither did the senses in the case of the 
mind. 125 Nyssen maintained also that, despite being able to point towards the nature of 
the human mind due to the human experience of sense perception, “our mind, which is 
the likeness of the Creator [who] evades our knowledge, has an accurate resemblance to 
the superior nature, figuring by its own unknowableness the incomprehensible [that is, 
divine] Nature.” 126 Ultimately the relation of the mind, soul, and body is as mysterious as 
the ineffable nature which they resemble. By maintaining that the mind exists in 
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communication with the whole body – though not itself a corporeal part – Gregory 
preserved the like sense of the presence of God in the kosmos.     
The material and immaterial, although they were inherently unified in human 
nature, were still distinct in terms of their operation. Gregory considered the body as 
strictly the material aspect of human nature. Like his sharp distinction between creature 
and Creator, for Gregory there was no crossover of traditionally immaterial elements (e.g. 
the soul) into material existence.127 This did not frustrate the definite unity between the 
material and immaterial in his thought, but he did wish to avoid the (primarily Stoic) 
philosophic doctrines that the soul or mind required physical manifestation to be present 
with the body. Just as with his theological doctrine of the divine essence and energies, 
Gregory meant to show relation between the material and immaterial without crossing the 
categoric barriers intended for the essence of the human mind and the energies involved 
in human activity. The perfect unity of the Godhead in its essence and energies provided 
Gregory with a foundational concept for the unity of the human person in its essence and 
sensible operation.128 The operation and essence were not synonymous (as with 
Eunomius’s error, confusing the divine attribute of uncreatedness with essential nature), 
but were unified. As God’s nature could not be pointed towards without the revelatory 
presence of the divine energy, humans – even as their nature was both sensible and 
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intelligible129 – could not have true communion with the sensible without a union 
between their essence and their energies. 
The general milieu of Platonic thought, along with the legacy of theology left by 
Alexandrians like Origen, proposed to unify the human organism only in a temporary 
sense. Instead of having their unity and creation joined together, they supposed a dual 
existence of the mind and the body, where the soul eternally existed before the creation of 
the body and would exist eternally long after its dissolution.130 Their conception was one 
of eternal creation of human souls by the Logos, which in time led to the embodiment of 
the soul. This embodiment was a lowering of the soul’s nature, through which it came 
increasingly susceptible to the irrational nature, becoming like the beasts. Gregory mocks 
this notion: 
They tell us that one of their sages said that he, being one and the same 
person, was born a man, and afterwards assumed the form of a woman, 
and flew about with the birds, and grew as a bush… he who said these 
things of himself did not, so far as I can judge, go far from the truth: for 
such doctrines as this of saying that one soul passed through so many 
changes are really fitting for the chatter of frogs or jackdaws, or the 
stupidity of fishes, or the insensibility of trees.131 
Just as in Gregory’s thought, however, the conviction that the beginning would be like 
the end guided the Origenian and Platonic view. The separation of body and soul that 
occurred at death led to a reintegration, reunion, with the Logos.132 Gregory, however, 
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argued that, on the ground that the Platonic descent of the soul was a precedent for 
continual change for the worse, that the migration of the soul from its ultimately 
intelligible nature to the non-rational would mean that the soul would eventually change 
its essential nature.133 If this change occurred, humans would essentially become beasts. 
As will be seen, Gregory’s eschatological hopes for humanity could not allow for their 
nature to change in this way, nor abandon ultimately the image of God. 
Departing from Origen’s adoption of the Platonic theory of the immortality of the 
soul, Nyssen considered the sensible and intellectual aspects of the human person to be 
inseparable, having a unity akin to the unity of the Godhead.134 Consisting of both a 
visible and hidden part, Gregory considered the body and soul to exist concurrently, only 
and ever being together – life itself being the joint existence of the two together. To 
express this, Nyssen compared human life to the way that wheat develops. Though there 
are a plurality of aspects (the stalk, the grain, the leaves) within the one form of the plant, 
each of them develops conjointly with one another. There may be an order to the 
maturity, but the sequence leading to the realization of the plant’s potential comes solely 
from the “potentiality of its nature” contained within its seed, not through the external 
imposition of another essence. That is, the soul did not come into existence externally 
from the body and afterwards come to be embodied – instead the two developed together. 
Furthermore, Nyssen’s particular treatment of the human body ought to be 
understood as a synthesis between philosophic thought and biblical exegesis, in the same 
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vein as Basil’s cosmological teaching in the Hexameron.135 Those things unique to 
biblical teaching, most of all the image of God in humanity, Gregory drew out primarily 
in terms of scriptural language. Gregory’s discussion of the body using reason, however, 
played a supplemental role – further explicating his discussion of human nature and 
drawing out theological concepts which followed from his scriptural exegesis. For 
example, in On the making of man he describes the sinful nature as heavy in substance, 
drawing down the soul to earthly and non-rational things.136 The characteristics of animal 
creation – Gregory refers to the nobility of the horse, and the greed of pigs – can be found 
within human expression because of humanity’s twofold nature and the body’s 
communion with them. This extends beyond his scriptural exegesis of the creation 
narrative into a cosmological proof of the necessary nature of the Fall and human 
inclination towards sin.137 Gregory’s questions and answers in On the making of man are 
scientific prima facie but are ultimately theologically understood within a framework led 
by the scriptural narrative. 
Near the beginning of On the making of man Gregory gives theological meaning 
to human physiology. The formation of “our nature” Gregory takes as evidence for God 
as the great “Artificer,” who arranged both the body and soul “to be adapted for 
royalty.”138 For the soul, this is chiefly expressed in its noble and intellectual nature, 
whereas Gregory considers the body to be functionally oriented towards communion with 
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its Creator. He presented this orientation as manifest through various features: the 
uprightness of the human figure allowed for contemplation of what was above rather than 
what was below; the use of hands rather than an elongated muzzle also made it 
unnecessary for humans to stoop and bow low to the ground in order to feed. The voice, 
the “proper adornment” for the rational capability of human nature, serves as the 
instrument of the soul, being somewhere between the operation of the flute and the 
lyre.139  Furthermore, Gregory considered the freedom afforded human hands, since they 
did not support the body’s posture, to be the “special property of the rational nature” of 
humanity.140 Human dexterity allowed for precision in cooperation “with the bidding of 
reason,” and presented humanity with the opportunity to form written characters – to 
create language in likeness to a God who through the Word created the kosmos. These 
features, rather than brute strength or natural weaponry, were the means by which 
humanity was meant to rule over creation. 
At the conclusion of the treatise, Gregory briefly discussed the medical 
composition of human bodies. Relating to his earlier explication of the vegetative, 
sensible, and intellectual levels of the human soul, Gregory described the human body in 
terms of these conceptual tiers.141 The hard and rigid parts of the body, the bones, relate 
to the nutritive category and are below the level of sense. Their operation is growth and 
stability. Connected to these parts, however, are substances that have a hardness and 
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softness to them. This tier correlates to the sensible and facilitate our participation in the 
operation of perception. Finally, the soft portions of the body, relying on the other two 
levels for their organization and incorporation into the body, sends “into them all that 
self-moving and determining force,” or “determining spirit.” Here Gregory is speaking of 
the nerves which interface with the sensible parts of the body.142 Above all these 
categories Nyssen naturally elevates the status of those especially significant parts of the 
human body, such as the brain, the heart, and the liver. Each of these parts, in turn, rely 
on one another (1 Cor. 12) and “no part of it might be left ineffectual or unprofitable for 
the regulation of the whole organism.”143  
His purpose in the discussion of the body in this way, however, was to underscore 
two essential understandings: first, that the body itself cannot sustain its vital activity on 
its own. Instead, again emphasizing the gap between creature and Creator, Gregory noted 
that the body “imports from without for the preservation of the living being.” This is 
because “the Divinity alone is free from needs.”144 Second, to “show that the seminal 
cause of our constitution is neither a soul without body, nor a body without soul.”145 The 
genius of the human person is that each part of its twofold nature develops alongside the 
other, bringing “about that the Divine image [that] does not at once shine forth at our 
formation, but brings man to perfection by a certain method and sequence, through those 
attributes of the soul which are material, and belong rather to the animal creation.”146 
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Gregory’s conviction is that the body, even in its connection with lower order of creation 
it is the instrument of the soul, and the vehicle for concurrent corporeal and intellectual 
maturity.147 Furthermore, Gregory believed that the body can reflect the image of God.148 
Indeed, the general thrust of his anthropology in On the making of man is an expression 
of the instrumental nature of the human body for the human person.149 The human soul, 
Gregory believed, found its fulfillment in embodied existence. Likewise, the body, by its 
association with the soul, had ability to share in the nobility of the intellectual nature. At 
times the body’s impairments might affect the mind’s capacity to work out the expression 
of the image, the image persisted.150 In other words Gregory regarded the body, rather 
than being the sum total of the human person, as intimately connected with the human 
mind and only expressive of personhood insofar as it was in a healthy state. Through this 
psychosomatic union, the human person “was constituted as a rational, thinking being… 
capable of self-determination and of completing the progress of her self-understanding in 
relationship to the deity.”151  
A last important point of understanding Gregory’s thought on the human body is 
his emphasis on the bodily resurrection of humanity. He considered physical resurrection 
to have been God’s intent from the beginning.152 In On the making of man Nyssen 
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utilized the precedent set forth in the parable of Lazarus and Dives.153 Since the two men 
are spoken of as still having a semblance of bodily form, Gregory assumes that, in some 
sense, that a bodily reconstitution awaits humanity. His teaching is most immanently 
revealed, however, in his bedside dialogue with Macrina in On the soul and resurrection, 
where the process of bodily resurrection is brought into question.  
In Gregory’s view, the bodily resurrection must occur on personal lines: if the 
same man is to return into himself, he must be the same entirely, and regain his original 
formation in every single atom of his elements.”154 The question that he entertains in the 
dialogue is how elements, once dispersed, could come together once again to form the 
original. If the soul departed, without the body, the argument could be made that a bodily 
resurrection, as Gregory hoped for, was impossible. There would be no means by which 
the variety of elements which composed the human body could find their way back into 
union to reconstitute a body, much less the body of a specific person. Gregory brought 
this objection against Macrina by using the analogy of a ship and a sailor.155 A ship that 
wrecks, dissolving in a manner like the body, has its parts cast into disparate parts of the 
ocean. The soul, guiding and steering the ship as sailor, has no means to reassemble its 
vessel itself. After the wreck, the sailor could at most remain on one part of the ship, 
rather than in some way presiding over all the parts and somehow later bring them back 
together.  
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Macrina responds categorically objecting to the assumptions made about the soul 
in the analogy. The soul, in a way like the adiastemic nature of God, was intelligible and 
immaterial, and lacked spatial bounds (as discussed before). Therefore, Nyssen, in the 
voice of his sister, argued that the soul was not “compressed” inside the body while 
constituted, and likewise was not freed upon the dissolution of the body.156 Instead, “even 
though the body is dispersed, it remains in the world, which is itself within the hands of 
God.”157 Macrina clarified this point by responding with another analogy. The soul, the 
grand artwork of the divine painter, and the elements of the body, like a mixture of hues 
of paint, are originally and uniquely constituted apart from all other matter. At the point 
of death, however, the tints that made up the mixture according to the artistry of the 
painter were dispersed. God, being the masterful artist, remembered “the exact nature of 
that colour” which he used to produce each art piece.158 According the pattern which God 
had already laid down (the soul) he reconstituted the body. The soul would “persistently 
cling to the familiar atoms, until their concourse after this division again takes place in 
the same way” at the resurrection.  
 Overall, it is Gregory’s conviction that humanity, stamped with the divine image 
and created as a union of body and soul, is yet ultimately a mystery to itself. Endowed 
with the capacity for divine likeness and existing as a unity of diverse operations, human 
nature’s inherent potential had to be realized through the divine restoration 
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() of all humanity and growth into beings infinitely desiring 
() the infinite God. 
“That which is expected to appear afterwards”; and  
When he spoke of the fate of humanity, Nyssen’s belief rested on his conviction 
that “the resurrection promises us nothing else than the restoration of the fallen to their 
ancient state.”159 Beyond the hope of the resurrection, he believed that humankind had a 
destiny that, by divine power, would involve their remaking into the image of God. 
Staying in rhythm with his convictions about humanity’s imagehood and essentially 
embodied nature, Gregory believed that humans would be restored to the manner of their 
existence prior to their fall into the habitual nature of sin. Natural image-bearing would 
give way to infinite growth () in likeness, and human bodies would “be 
restored… with a brighter and more entrancing beauty.”160  
Gregory’s expression of this belief, and his discussion of restoration 
() placed him nearby to others (under the broad umbrella of 
“Origenism”) who fell under the anathema of the second council of Constantinople in 
553.161 The anathema itself evinces that Gregory was not alone in his speculative venture 
into discussion of a final restoration. Other church fathers, most notable among them 
Origen of Alexandria, had developed a theology of hope based on the expectation of the 
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universal restoration () of all created things. Therefore, to 
understand the connection of Gregory’s theological anthropology and the future he 
anticipated for humanity, one ought to observe those points of Nyssen’s similarity and 
departure from the thought of Origen and the other Cappadocian fathers.  
Origen was the most expansive and thorough of those theologians who wrote 
concerning apokatastasis. Although it can be difficult to discern the elements of Origen’s 
actual belief from the influence of his thought upon later Origenist theologians, there are 
certain emphases which distinguish his view of universal human restoration.162 His 
claims for the final restoration centered primarily around the importance of his 
Christology to his overall theology. Christ’s victory over death rendered it eternally inert; 
Death, as a spent force, could no longer lay claim to human life even in the eschaton. The 
resurrection of Christ, who was himself a human being, ontologically changed the fate of 
humanity by their subsisting eternally in the body Christ.163 Instead of being the fate of 
only those who in this life were grafted into the body of Christ, the apokatastasis of 
Origen entailed an end in which God became “all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28).  The suffering of 
humanity in the resurrection, spoken of by Christ, would yet occur, but the fire to which 
he referred would be purifying in nature (1 Cor. 3:11-15). There would be, in the 
eschaton, punishment and reward. Rather than humans undergoing either punishment or 
reward, Origen believed that any human experience of punishment administered by 
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God’s judgement – the fires of hell – would be towards the end of receiving a reward.164 
Origen was unwilling to consider hell and heaven in the same ontological category. He 
considered God, along with Gregory and the Platonic thinkers, to be the grounds of 
being. The eternal nature of hell could not be said to be parallel to the eternity of a life 
with God in heaven.165 A final and important point of Origen’s eschatology was his belief 
in the monadic nature of the beginning and ending of existence. Human restoration was a 
return to a pre-existent spiritual state in union with God because, as mentioned before, he 
subscribed to the Platonic belief in the pre-existence of souls in the intellectual realm 
prior to their embodiment. Therefore, the end of human existence for Origen was 
likewise an intellectual and bodiless existence, achieving in this way unity with God over 
infinite ages.166  
Basil had a more critical view of Origen’s theology than the other two 
Cappadocian fathers. Brian Daley argues that Basil’s disagreement largely stemmed from 
his understanding of the “importance of the prospects of judgement and retribution in the 
moral life of Christians.”167 This concern, although expressed less harshly, was one that 
Nyssen shared. Basil’s critique tended to use more traditional imagery when teaching on 
salvation and eschatology. These were meant to prepare his listeners, training them to 
resist the temptations and passions. Basil’s continuity with other Christian thinkers comes 
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mostly from his tendency towards spiritualizing the language of the scriptures and 
willingness to leave the nature of the final days in abstract language and apophasis.168  
Gregory the theologian, or Gregory of Nazianzus, spoke in a more cautious way 
than Origen, but yet appreciated many of the facets of his theology of hope. Nazianzus 
also expressed the notion that sin as ontologically meriting a suffering, rather than God 
himself being the source of the punishment of the sinner. His belief was that sin brought 
about an eternal shame and suffering through alienation from God.169 Therefore, the 
sinner, in the eschaton, would undergo a remedial or purifying suffering – similar, but 
changed slightly from Origen’s therapeutic and pedagogical view. He also expressed the 
time of restoration () as the time in which humanity would be wholly 
receptive of God by using the language of God as “all in all.”170 The greatest differences, 
however, laid in Nazianzus’s theological polemics against Novatianist rigorism. In 
combating the notion that post-baptismal sins were not covered by the blood of Christ, he 
emphasized a two-fold notion of salvation that at the same time affirmed the efficacy of 
the baptismal water and also underscored the processive nature of salvation. His 
soteriology was, as will be seen with Nyssen, an anthropologically driven understanding 
of soteriology. Nazianzus preferred to talk about the salvation of all in connection to 
human imagehood and formation into the divine image, setting an important precedent 
for the concept of theosis in Christian theology.171 As with Origen, the importance of 
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Christ played a central role, but Nazianzus’s emphasis lay in the transition of humanity 
from the Adamic type to that of Christ as a model for the salvific narrative. 
The restoration for which Gregory hoped can be distinguished from the views of 
these other theologians most poignantly by identifying the nature of Gregory’s view of 
Christian life – both in the present spiritual life as well as resurrection life. Therefore, 
before delving into the larger concept of apokatastasis and Gregory’s understanding of 
the resurrection, it is necessary to lay out some examples of one specific portion of his 
hope: the concept of infinite progress, or .  
Between his doctrine of divine infinity and human mutability, Gregory used his 
thoroughly theological understanding of anthropology to describe the human spiritual life 
as progressive growth in contemplative desire for God. “[The] Divine is by its very 
nature infinite, [and] enclosed by no boundary,” in a manner similar to human perfection 
in virtue: “in the case of virtue we have learned that… its one limit of perfection is the 
fact that it has no limit.”172 As Everett Ferguson states, “The infinity of God is the basis 
for the infinity of virtue.”173 The idea that perfection lacks limits, therefore, implies a 
degree of unattainability in a manner similar to divine infinity implying divine 
incomprehensibility. This should not, however, preclude human effort for growth in 
knowledge of God, nor slacken human striving for growth in virtue. Instead, a practice of 
perpetual progress, little by little, will allow humanity to grow. This epektatic growth is 
                                              
172 Life of Moses, 29-30. “as I have said, perfection is not marked off by limits: The one limit of 
virtue is the absence of a limit. How then would one arrive at the sought-for boundary when he can find no 
boundary?”  
 
173 Everett Ferguson, “God’s infinity and man’s mutability: perpetual progress according to 
Gregory of Nyssa” Greek Orthodox Theological Review 18.1-2 (Spring-Fall, 1973): 66. 
 
 
 
53 
 
“through exertion,” and, in the case of virtue, is analogous to the exercise of a muscle. 
Though the task of attaining Godly virtue is beyond human grasping, “this kind of 
activity alone does not slacken its intensity by the effort, but increases it.”174  
With this acknowledgement, however, Gregory remained convinced that human 
effort alone could not be responsible for epektasis. First, the “nature of the Good” was to 
attract “to itself those who look to it.”175 After all, Gregory believed that since humans 
had a conception of virtue and had seen that virtuous action does occur, that such 
behavior was immanent evidence of humanity’s created goodness and origin with God.176 
Therefore, due to the connection between divine and human nature, a sort of synergism in 
epektatic growth emerged in Gregory’s thought. Next, Gregory described the manner of 
this cooperation as the result of “long training and supernatural illumination.” God 
provides spiritual assistance “at our birth,” but also is alongside human effort “whenever 
we apply ourselves to diligent training in higher life and strip ourselves for the more 
vigorous contests.”177 
Beginning in this life, humanity could grasp after material or spiritual desires. 
Both desires operated along the tracks of human mutability – the material desires would 
grow like the spiritual ones if indulged but could not sustain perpetual progress due to the 
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limitation of evil.178 The spiritual desires, by contrast, grew in strength, but also 
progressed in a manner unchecked by limits, even into the time of restoration. This 
marked a departure in Gregory’s thought from the Platonic notion of rest in the time of 
reintegration of humanity with the divine.179 Instead, the end would be like the beginning 
of humanity: as creatures drawn from non-being into being, humanity would continue in 
motion towards the unreachable heights of divine knowledge and virtue. In attaining to 
the heights, humanity would also come to grow into a greater likeness of God. As within 
the preface to his Life of Moses, Gregory supposed that the “perfection of human nature 
consists perhaps in its very growth in goodness.”180 Humanity participated by way of the 
energies of God ontologically to come into being, and so also their continued being 
related to their participation in the energies of God through their progress in virtue. 
Gregory held that human participation in the divine life was most eminently 
secured by the incarnation of Christ. In her article on epektasis, Kristina Robb-Dover 
recognizes within Gregory’s thought the centrality of Christ in human ability to 
participate within the divine oikonomia.181 In the Life of Moses Gregory presents several 
images of Christ’s presence which embody his integral role in human epektasis. The most 
emphatic of these images is Moses’s security in his viewing of God by way of the “hole 
in the rock” which is Christ.182 In Moses’s desire to see God face to face, he expressed 
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his desire to progress to a height infinitely beyond human capacity. God, acquiescing to 
Moses’ request, allows him to see himself in some sense. Gregory interprets:  
This truly is the vision of God: never to be satisfied in the desire to see 
him. But one must always, by looking at what he can see, rekindle his 
desire to see more. Thus, no limit would interrupt growth in the ascent to 
God, since no limit to the Good can be found nor is the increasing of 
desire for the Good brought to an end because it is satisfied.183 
Mysteriously, the growth and ascent which Moses undertook Gregory understands as 
progress achieved by “standing still.” Being both perpetually in motion as befitting a 
creature and resting on the Rock which is Christ in a manner befitting the motionless 
creator, Moses came to “see” God, and thereby became radiant. The movement and 
participation of human persons in the divine nature “comes only to the degree that she 
apprehends and embraces her need for Christ.”184 
This participation, in Cappadocian thought, is one of the chief elements of the 
spiritual life. Humanity’s taking on of the attributes (or participate in the energies of) God 
allows them to become through the exercise of virtue and will that which God is by 
nature.185 The idea of divinization (theosis) emerges also in Gregory’s Homilies on the 
Beatitudes, where he speaks of how the process of divine participation is not restricted 
only to the life to come, but rather has its beginning in this present life. Participating in 
the virtues outlined in the Beatitudes are the starting point for the divine work of 
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divinization in one’s life.186 This process, rather, than being completed, goes on even in 
the life to come. This does not remove, however, the reality of Christ’s saying “Blessed 
are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted.” Gregory might say that when Christ 
preached on the Beatitudes he spoke truly by expressing the eschatological reality of the 
peace and comfort of the life to come but expressed also the ongoing nature of that 
blessing as being part and parcel of ongoing life with God. To be clear, Gregory 
understood that this life as existing not only “in the eschaton, but in the present.”187  
Gregory’s doctrine of apokatastasis signified a return to humanity’s angelic state, 
which was from the beginning God’s intention. This return, however, should not be 
understood as a reversion, but a return with maturity – what Smith calls the “fulfillment 
of the germinally perfect form.”188 Humanity in the garden had been created in the image 
of God, and the universal restoration of humanity would be the ultimate act to secure 
human likeness and union with the divine energies (vis. Philippians 2:10). Gregory’s 
understanding was that since evil and death were by nature non-substantive, that in the 
final restoration they would cease to be – since God would become (as with Origen) “all 
in all” there would be nothing left to serve as a vessel or container of the emptiness of 
sin.189  
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Acknowledging the nature of non-being in sin and wickedness does, however, 
raises the question of its origin and association with human beings. As discussed before 
with the nature of the passions and virtues, it must be stressed that the passions, unlike 
evil and sin,  
have not been allotted to human nature for any bad purpose at all (for the 
Creator would most certainly be the author of evil, if in them, so deeply 
rooted as they are in our nature, any necessities of wrong-doing were 
found), but according to the use which our free will puts them to, these 
emotions of the soul become the instruments of virtue or of vice.190 
For Gregory, God’s foreknowledge of humanity’s fall comes not from his 
foreordained will that humanity sin, but rather that since humanity is created, their 
coming to be involves the movement from non-being into being. That precedent of 
change within human nature led to (but did not necessitate) the Fall.191 Therefore, instead 
of guilt being ascribed to one who sins on the basis of their own errors (which, as 
discussed before, Gregory sees as inevitable) it is instead ascribed by “proximity to the 
offense” which is death and non-being.192 Generally, Gregory’s approach to sin is to 
consider it a wound, and that humanity needs therapeutic care to attain to life. The wound 
of sin can fester and deepen if left unattended, and humanity itself has need to take divine 
medicine.193 
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Gregory clarified his understanding of evil and death’s nature of non-being by 
comparing the effects of our proximity to it as to a flame in three stages of succession: 
desire (), pleasure (), and passion ().194 In the first stage, desire, 
humans are attracted by the means of their senses to something that is understood and 
seen. The continual presence of that which attracts our desire breeds pleasure, which 
leads to a lenience in the will. After an increasing period of lenience, the pleasure grows 
into a passion that draws the afflicted even in the absence of the desire. Desire itself, 
alongside the patient, is put to death by the growth of the passion.195 Thus the progressive 
decline of a human into sin can be understood as being consumed by fire. The being, its 
desires, and its passions alike may burn for a time, but come to their end by settling back 
into non-being. 
The separation and non-entity inherent in the presence of pathology should also 
be understood within the context of Gregory’s engagement of the term in its medical and 
philosophic context. Galen, in his discussion of described it as the kind of 
unnatural motion that comes from outside whereas the “energy” of an object described 
the motion of an object that emerges from the object. 196 Gregory, adopting the notion, 
agreed that pathology indicated states in the body (and the soul) that were external to 
nature, but wished to maintain the distinction between the state of the body and the soul. 
He considered viciousness and sin as later occurring infirmities, as invaders, to the 
                                              
194 Klager, 160. 
 
195 Life of Moses, 131. 
 
196 Wessel, 39-40. 
 
 
 
59 
 
natural state of human being.197 If a pathology affected one or the other, Greek 
philosophy would question how they could be said to be distinct but related. Gregory’s 
response was to treat the notion theologically. The human mind, in its comprehension of 
the divine, acted as a mirror – subsisting as an image only insofar as it continued to 
“remain in likeness to the archetype.”198 The body, in a similar fashion, operated as a 
mirror for the mind (), and reflected its essential nature only insofar as its archetype 
– in this case, the body’s archetype being the complete union with the mind while in the 
state of perfect health. Gregory believed that perfect bodily life “is in the rational (I mean 
the human) nature, which both is nourished, endowed with sense, and also partakes of 
reason and is ordered by mind.”199 If a human being, falling into the pathos of sin, 
obscured the image of God within them, their operation as a mirror for the divine energy 
was disrupted. The human body, when it fell into a physical pathology, obscured its 
operation as a mirror for the human mind. In this way, Gregory applies the concept of 
essence and energies which he first applies to explain the divine nature to his 
understanding of the human relation of the sin as a pathology to the unity of the body and 
mind. Each link in this chain of images, in this diminishing progression of mirrors, were 
distinct because, despite the disruption that could occur within the chain, the operation of 
the chain of mirrors was in one direction: downwards. That is, when obscurity due to a 
pathology occurred in the human mind or soul, it reflected down the chain into the 
immanent physical image of the body: “for the mind takes the lead, and chooses the 
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expedient course by reason and not by passion, while their nature follows in the tracks of 
its leader.”200 The divine nature, however, remained untouched because of its 
transcendence of the human image, despite the divine image remaining within the 
(obscured) human. Similarly, with the human relationship with the body and the mind, 
the obscurity caused by physical pathology marked a departure in physical reality from 
the healthy image of the human body present in the mind. Thereby, the human mind’s 
intelligible nature allowed it to withdraw from and transcend the pathologies of the body, 
all the while subsisting with it.201  
Thus, for Gregory, sin and evil must be discussed in terms of privation of good, in 
a manner like discussing cold as the absence of heat or darkness as the absence of 
light.202  The wickedness that has beset human nature (as with Origen and Nazianzen) 
could not be considered on the same essential level as the goodness of God. The 
unchanging and infinite nature of God, being more firm and substantive, overcame the 
finite and mutable nature of humanity that would “not remain settled even in evil.”203 As 
with the discussion of epektasis above, the final state of humanity would continue to be 
that of motion – but the creative intent of infinite motion towards God would be realized.  
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The non-rational impulses that assisted in our growth in virtue, such as the desire 
spoken about in On the soul and resurrection, would no longer exist within human 
nature.204 They will be peeled away as they are no longer needed for assistance in 
drawing humanity toward God. In a similar way, Nyssen speaks in On the soul and 
resurrection of the “coats of skins” that will be laid aside at the final restoration.205 
Certain qualities of bodies, such as sexual differentiation (vis. Galatians 3:28), growth, 
and aging will be laid aside in favor of “something more subtle and ethereal.”206  Gregory 
comments that “it does not seem to me that our hope is one for those things which are 
now subjected by God to man for the necessary uses of life, but one for another kingdom, 
of a description that belongs to unspeakable mysteries.”207 The emphasis in his thought 
lies in the understanding that, although these aspects of embodiment may continue on in 
existence, their functionality will no longer be needed to secure union with God.  
Because God created humanity in his image Gregory had to reconcile his concept 
of imagehood with the reality of human existence, including its division into male and 
female. This involved heavy exegesis in On the making of man of the passage in Gen. 
1:26-27, where Gregory interpreted the divine act of creation.208 J. Warren Smith argues 
that Gregory views God’s separation of humanity into gendered existence is the result of 
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his anticipation of the fall. Rather than intending from the beginning that humanity exist 
as male and female, God created humanity according to his image with the intent that, in 
the eschaton, that they live in a manner like the angels. As Gregory specifies, “He 
devised for His image the distinction of male and female, which has no reference to the 
Divine Archetype, but, as we have said, is an approximation to the less rational 
nature.”209 Therefore the distinction of gender is an aspect of divine accommodation in 
Gregory’s thought. God would not have established gender differentiation among humans 
in this sense if he had foreknown that humanity would not fall.210 In comparison, Basil 
believed that humanity’s imagehood and likeness stood further apart from bodily 
existence. Therefore, when he speaks of gendered humanity, Basil speaks of the one 
nature of human virtue, and likewise one calling to divine likeness. Since the body is not 
directly involved in the image of God, male and female alike are “absolutely equal.”211 
With respect to the equality of the presence of image and calling to likeness, Gregory 
would certainly agree.212 The emphasis of his theology, however, demanded that he also 
account for the whole of human nature, including the body. Christ in the incarnation took 
on the whole of human nature, including gendered existence, in order to make the whole 
of humanity subject to God the Father. For Gregory, as discussed before, this wholeness 
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(naturally) has reference to the entirety of humanity corporately, but also extended 
incarnationally to include all of humanity corporeally.213  
Humanity, according to Gregory, could have continued in a manner like the 
angels (that is, both in a state different from present as well as without the need for sexual 
difference) indefinitely, but yet remain an embodied composite of an intellectual and 
corporeal nature. Created human nature, then, has within it the two-sided nature 
discussed before with the additional sense that the rational part is undivided and that the 
corporeal part is (sexually) divided in a manner like the animals. Smith clarifies that 
humanity was not created in two separate creative acts, but a creation of a “double aspect 
of human nature” where the qualities which define the rational and non-rational parts 
occur before and after one another “only at the level of God’s intention.”214 As Gregory 
puts it, God’s creation of “man” is according to the “indefinite character of the term,” 
which in turn should include “all humanity” in the “first” of these two aspects of creation. 
God created “universal humanity” in its “consummation” logically first; the second 
aspect of human nature, apparent in Adam’s “heavy corporeal existence”, is “the thing 
formed of earth… the man ‘of the earth’ [].”215 
Therefore, the passionate, or earthly, character of human sexuality of which 
Gregory wrote came not out of human inability to tame the passions but from its 
inception in kinship with the animal creation. Human sexuality does, however, 
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accommodate sin insofar as both the hypersensuality of procreation and sin share what 
Smith calls a “sensual orientation.”216 This orientation is characteristic of the non-
rational, or appetitive, aspect of the soul discussed before. Sexuality, for Gregory, is not 
by its nature sinful, but it does increase the desire of humanity for non-rational things and 
causes the intellect frustration in seeking to become more reflective of the divine image 
rather than the image of the non-rational animals which it takes on.217 Sexuality and sin 
have connection in Gregory’s thought, but the former is not cause for the latter. These 
desires, or passions, are necessary for moral action in this life, but they do not compose 
the imagehood of the human soul.218 Indeed, in the life to come, Gregory implies that 
gender and sexuality, as with other accretions that exist only in this temporal life, will 
cease to be significant in the eschaton.219 Gregory concludes his thoughts with a 
characteristic statement of apophasis:  
The cause, indeed, of this device, only those can know who were eye-
witnesses of the truth and ministers of the Word; but we, imagining the 
truth, as far as we can, by means of conjectures and similitudes, do not set 
forth that which occurs to our mind authoritatively, but will place it in the 
form of a theoretical speculation before our kindly hearers.220 
The presence of human sexuality and other physical characteristics did not 
disqualify for Gregory, however, the truth of a bodily resurrection. The body that we take 
on in the resurrection will be similar to the one that we had in this life, both in terms of 
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their form and their substance. As Susan Wessel states, Gregory believed the resurrection 
would be a “complete restoration of the individual characteristics of the human person,” 
including the mind and the body: the whole person.221 Gregory considered this 
conception of the human person to combat the Platonic (as well as Origenian) belief in 
the transmigration of the soul and eventual bodiless existence in apokatastasis.222 Their 
understanding that the resurrection implies a separation and dissolution of the current 
body is correct, but it is, Gregory insists, “that the same body again as before, composed 
of the same atoms, is compacted around the soul” in the final restoration.223 For both 
Gregory and the Platonic thinkers, the beginning of existence would be like the end. 
Gregory, however, contended that the beginning of human existence was an embodied 
existence. If it were that the soul came to dwell on its own in an ethereal reality apart 
from embodied existence, there would be no reason that that ending state would not 
relapse into the cycle of embodiment.224  
There remains an open question on the interpretation of Gregory’s writings on the 
passions, the emotions, within human life and virtue. Some have argued that his teaching 
is that of Greek apatheia, or of a mortification of the passionate drives to pursue instead 
the higher things of the spiritual life.225 Reading through Gregory’s more ascetical 
writings – in his praise for his sister, Macrina, or his treatise On virginity – could lead a 
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reader with the impression that Nyssen prized an impassible life. The Stoic philosophers 
held this view of the emotions, and this view was not without its admirers among the 
church fathers.226 Some scholars have argued that Gregory, however, would likely agree 
more with the view expressed by Platonic philosophers, perhaps most well known as the 
analogy of the charioteer.227 The charioteer, understood as human capability for free will 
and rational thought, the Platonic logistikon, has two horses reigned into her chariot: one 
horse, a strong and upstanding beast symbolizing spirited human nature – human ability 
to experience higher emotions like honor and courage; the other, a wild and untamed 
horse symbolizing desirous and appetitive human passions.228 Without the participation 
of both horses under the control of the charioteer, the vehicle will not operate properly. If 
one is removed, the ability for the chariot to navigate is direly impaired. Here the 
objective is not passionlessness, but restraint and control over human emotion. The 
feeling of sorrow for sin, anger in sight of injustice, or desire for the higher divine life are 
each examples of human passion properly restrained.229 The passions, for Gregory, have 
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a tenuous relationship with human virtue – leaving open the possibility for virtue by 
exercising control over them, but not being part of the image of God in humanity. 
Therefore, while necessary for growth in this life, the passions will not continue to have 
meaningful existence (as discussed above with human sexuality) in the restoration of all 
things.230 Instead, God will become “all in all,” superseding the expediency of current 
human existence. 
Lastly, Gregory’s understood human will and destiny guiding a person not 
towards one of two locations, but instead to that of one eschatological reality that humans 
experience differently based on their “ontological composition in either passions or 
virtue.”231 In the Life of Moses Gregory illustrates this idea through the plague narrative. 
The Egyptians and the Hebrews, both living in Egypt, experienced the power of God in 
their own ways. For example, in the plague of darkness, Gregory writes that  
Perhaps someone, taking his departure from the fact that after three days 
of distress in darkness the Egyptians did share in the light, might be led to 
perceive the final restoration [] which is expected to take 
place later in the kingdom of heaven of those who have suffered 
condemnation in Gehenna. For that darkness that could be felt, as the 
history says, has a great affinity both in its name and in its actual meaning 
to the exterior darkness. Both are dispelled when Moses, as we have 
perceived before, stretched forth his hands on behalf of those in 
darkness… [Which became] for those others also the healing of pain and 
the deliverance from punishment.232 
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In this way Gregory’s view of the restoration of all things is one of therapeutic 
hope rather than a vision of final retribution. Certainly, both punishment and reward, 
heaven and hell, are realities for Gregory.233  The power and love of God will become 
immediately manifest to all humanity in the apokatastasis, but for the sinner these will be 
experienced as pain. Nyssen viewed the suffering and punishment, however, as directed 
toward the end of rehabilitating the sinner.234 Moreover, the suffering experienced for this 
restoration was not imposed by God, but instead was a preservation of the freedom of 
human will.235 God’s justice “follows” the free will of the sinner, as “each man makes his 
own plagues when through his own free will he inclines toward these painful 
experiences.”236 The lover of God, however, experiences deliverance, true freedom, and a 
satisfaction of their desires: to ever pursue God to greater heights. 
Redeeming “that which is now seen”; sacramental and ascetic practice 
To this point Gregory’s view of the beginning of the life of virtue, the immediate 
practice of ascent in this life, has appeared in comparison to the original and final states 
of human nature. This is as it should be. The meaning of the Christian way of life, the 
practice and living of the faith, are senseless without purview to both their foundations 
and aims. These teachings are, however, lifeless if left without discernable the imprint 
upon the experience of the body of Christ, the church, incarnate in the world.  
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Human life, immersed in the created order, needed some way to be drawn up to 
God in order to participate in the salvation effected by Christ. Gregory believed human 
nature itself underwent a kind of transformation at the incarnation. When the Son had 
become human, God became flesh, a movement within humanity had emerged. Similar to 
his conviction about the pervasiveness of the mind over the body, Gregory believed that 
Christ through the incarnation evoked a “sense felt at once by the whole system.” 
Humanity, together counted as one person, had God’s nature fully revealed to it in Christ. 
His taking on of flesh and sharing in that nature caused the “resurrection principle” to 
pass through “the entire race, being imparted from the Member [Christ] to the whole.”237 
Though humanity would not in this lifetime attain to a full imitation, the journey began 
by participation in the practices that Christ established in his own life.  
Gregory described the church’s celebration of the Eucharist and the practice of 
baptismal regeneration as the means of the church’s pursuit of likeness to Christ. “The 
sacraments,” remarks Boersma, “constitute the initial transposition” of human life into 
the divine life.238 Christ, taking on human nature, began this process of transposition. 
Gregory believed that Christ had “realized an actual fellowship with man, and has 
effected life as a living fact, so that by means of the flesh which He has assumed, and at 
the same time deified, everything kindred and related may be saved along with it.”239  
Nyssen considered Christian baptism as a “mystery of regeneration” by which 
human persons were established on the “foundation of life.”240 By immersion in the 
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waters of baptism, the believer imitated Christ and participated in his death, burial, and 
resurrection. The sins and trespasses of the former life passed away and were put to 
death. The transformation of human life began in this act of imitation, which engaged the 
whole of the human person. The water itself, present to appease the human senses, 
communicated the human need for salvation in both body and soul.241 Since the human 
person was a psychosomatic whole, the believer experienced “by means of the cleansing 
in the water” a participation “in Purity; and true Purity is Deity.”242  
Here, again, Gregory’s understanding of human synergism presents a paradox 
inherent in his understanding of participation. Human sharing in the life of grace lie 
between being of “the work properly belonging to the Divine energy” and being 
“dependent on the power of him who is being borne.”243 Certainly God’s involvement in 
the rebirth of the believer could not be questioned, but Gregory clarifies the manner of 
human participation in baptism as being through both prayer, performance, and surrender. 
Before immersion prayer lifted the believer in an “invocation of heavenly grace.”244 This 
invocation presented the believer to God, and in manner like the raising of Christ on the 
cross. Next the “descent into the water”, or the burial of the sinner, is performed as a 
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“trine immersion” that models the three days in the tomb and the three persons of the 
Trinity.245 Finally, the individual surrenders to divine power by “either themselves 
[making] an actual addition to that grace, or at all events [not causing] the existing grace 
to miscarry.”246 That is, in the spiritual life that begins for the believer after being raised 
from the water, the effort required of the Christian is a passive sort, which admits of the 
efficacy of divine power and attempts to not impede the ongoing work of the Spirit.  
Following initiation into resurrection life, the believer requires nourishment to 
mature and grow up into the salvation granted in baptism. With this need for nourishment 
Gregory advances the idea that humanity is a twofold entity which partakes of the 
Eucharist for integration of the body into the incorruptible life. Through baptism the soul 
is “fused into Him through faith,” but the “body comes into fellowship and blending with 
the Author of our salvation” through partaking in “that very body which has shown to be 
superior to death.”247 The body of Christ, itself deified human flesh, worked in a manner 
similar to the sense of baptism mentioned above in that the sharing of the believer in the 
Eucharist was an assimilation of one element of a larger body to produce a transformed 
whole. Therefore, the Eucharist for Gregory is a matter of transformation (metapoiein, 
metastoicheioun) of the infinite into the finite, and the finite to the infinite.248 The infinite 
God, taking on the finite nature of humanity, translates the finite human capacity for 
spiritual maturity into an ever-greater longing. By partaking of the body and the blood of 
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Christ the believer “constantly expands the capacity of one’s mind and its desire for 
God.”249  
As the believer partakes of the Eucharist the body and mind together are 
consecrated, particularly as prayer sanctifies the eating of the body and blood. The words 
of invocation, “This is my Body,” reflect the reality that “the Word of God, Who is both 
God and the Word, coalesced with man’s nature” so “that by this communion with Deity 
mankind might at the same time be deified.” This sanctification of the elements is 
reflective of the transformation process that takes place in natural nourishment: as with 
food, what is consumed is assimilated into the body. For Gregory, however, the Eucharist 
is set apart as a meal because instead of the food being assimilated into the body, the 
body and blood of Christ, sanctified by the Word, assimilates the believer into that 
incorruptible body.250 As Penniman remarks, “For Gregory, Christians are saved and 
perfected by what they eat and by the one who feeds them.”251  
Lastly, it is necessary to clarify that Gregory does not believe that participation in 
the sacraments on their own merit grants an effective change in life. The baptism of the 
believer and the partaking of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist must coincide 
with a change in the mode of life. Nyssen readily admits that the imitation of Christ 
through the sacraments “does not admit of an exact and entire imitation, but it receives 
now as much as it is capable of receiving.” Neither human nature nor the elements 
themselves admit of a change in the case of the working of divine power, but Gregory is 
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quick to address the reality that a change must truly occur. In the case of Christian 
baptism, Gregory clarifies that,   
if, when the bath has been applied to the body, the soul has not cleansed 
itself from the stains of its passions and affections, but the life after 
initiation keeps on a level with the uninitiate life, then, though it may be a 
bold thing to say, yet I will say it and will not shrink; in these cases the 
water is but water, for the gift of the Holy Ghost in no ways appears in 
him who is thus baptismally born.252 
 
While in no way denying his earlier stance on their efficacy, Gregory maintains 
that the attitude of the believer evinces the measure of one’s reception of the divine life. 
Following the initiation and participation “the pursuit of anagogy dominates the life of 
the regenerated Christian.”253  
Generally regarded as a practice employed outside the bounds of the organized 
church, Gregory of Nyssa approached the ascetic life primarily under the influence of his 
elder sister, Macrina. Although, as mentioned before, Basil’s ecclesiastical ambitions 
overrode Gregory’s interest in the life of contemplation, it did not preclude his interest 
and praise of askesis. For Gregory, asceticism meant the mortification of the sinful 
tendencies of and a progression in the ever-ascending path towards the godly life. Indeed, 
Gregory believed the ascetic life to be none other than the (truly) Christian life, involving 
“fasting, chastity… renunciation of wealth, fame, and honor.”254 More concretely, 
however, one of Nyssen’s chief emphases was the pursuit of “knowledge of the 
incorruptible nature.”255 Although God’s nature was incomprehensible and unknowable, 
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the call which Gregory aspired was one in which the nature of God as revealed in the 
Son, through his names, and attributes, was the standard for imitation. This imitation, not 
for one part of the human nature only, was to be lived out in one’s intellectual, 
supernatural, and physical life – firmly within the limits of human nature established by 
God.256 
This meant a life of pursuing virtue in all regards, and indeed to do so without 
end. As discussed before, participation in virtue is none other than participation in the 
divine energies, and God, being infinite and without limit, is an object to be pursued into 
eternity.257 Gregory also believed that pursuing this virtuous life was an all-or-nothing 
affair, in which if “one virtue is removed, the others are also eliminated.” Likewise, the 
pursuit of vice in one area of one’s life contaminated the whole with perversity and 
prevented further growth in pursuing the good.258 Therefore the ascetic life was one of 
purgation first, cleansing oneself from the ills of the sinful nature, and of contemplation 
and praxis second. This distinction in order, not meant to undercut the value in either 
part, does preserve Gregory’s understanding of the pervasive and wicked effects of sin as 
the fall into non-being for human persons.  
Gregory’s understanding of ascetic practice was one of austerity and restraint. In 
the Life of Moses he discussed the austerity of this way of life as being a departure from 
Egypt, or the common pleasures of worldly life. The travelling equipment taken up by the 
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Israelites protect them from the power of the evil one and preserve them on their course: 
the “shoes are the self-controlled and austere life” that protects from the thorns of would-
be sin. The pleasures of this life, represented by the tunic, are drawn up “as tightly as 
possible” so as to allow the believer to “diligently finish the divine course.”259 In each of 
these cases it is a health stricture of those elements present in worldly life that are 
intended. As Cadenhead comments, Gregory “exhorts his readers to find the middle 
ground between excess and deficiency in the practice of temperance.”260 In this way the 
concern of one seeking the Christian life is one of being free from sin first, and pursuit of 
righteousness at a pace which matches the capacity of the individual on their journey. 
Progress in the journey is unmarked by measure but is attained by the 
contemplative practice of prayer and by bodily ascetical practices. These two approaches, 
working in tandem, provide steps on the upward journey towards life with God. 
Corresponding again to the twofold nature of humanity, the practice of prayer is the 
invitation for the believer to dwell in the “power and wisdom” of Christ.261 Thereby the 
Christian is able to intellectually ground themselves for the battle with sin and death. The 
bodily practices, naturally, correspond to the physical life of Christians. Gregory’s 
thought is that in the struggle against temptation and the power of the evil one, the body 
can be controlled (e.g. by vows of chastity, renunciation of wealth) and thus consume the 
“habitual passions.” This understanding is emphatically undergirded by Gregory’s 
anthropology: rather than the body or the mind being the arena for sin on their own, or 
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otherwise being the only arena in which the Christian combats evil, Gregory’s intent is to 
have Christians be engaged and victorious on all fronts.  
Conclusion 
 Complete victory of this sort, attained only by working under the power of God, is 
perhaps the most immediate aspect of Gregory’s theological anthropology. Indeed, his 
view of humanity is ultimately one of hope: first created in the image of God, destined 
for a future of restoration of all persons into full imagehood and likeness, and empowered 
toward the end by the dwelling of God with humanity.  
The unified nature of Gregory’s theology and anthropology has implications for 
theology today. An awareness of the connection between these strains of thought 
provides a new lens through which a theologian might consider their convictions held in 
other areas of study. For example, in the practical realm of theology, Gregory’s approach 
to spiritual growth as a perpetual progression towards an infinite God differs greatly from 
a less developed view in which human salvation involves only a static change of the 
believer from “in rebellion” to “saved.” Gregory’s understanding of the human person 
developing into the likeness of the image after which they were created is more true to 
God’s character and his creative intent for humanity. Theosis is certainly a more nuanced 
and complex view, allowing for greater expression of grace and love. Belief in an infinite 
and comprehensible God obliterates measure in forgiveness, and calls the believer into 
and ever closer walk with Him.  
In terms of ecclesiology, the oneness of human nature, redeemed by Christ, 
provides a theological explication for the scriptural directive of the “priesthood of all 
believers.” In the church, as Gregory expresses, the image bestowed and the likeness 
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sought after are also one, therefore the church should also be about the business of 
overcoming those distinctions, such as race and gender, which are elements added onto 
the image of God in humanity both within and outside of the body of Christ. Also, if one 
perceives God as creating and sanctifying the creation through contact with his energies, 
the view of the believer towards physical beauty, sacramental realities, and creation 
generally must change. The same God that transforms and becomes incarnate is the same 
God that created matter as a benefit to humanity’s salvific journey, transelements the 
believer through common things like water, bread, and wine, and intended from the 
beginning for all creation to be redeemed.  
Furthermore, Gregory approach to the issues of gender and sexuality, while they 
cannot be said to speak directly to issues of the twenty-first century, does offer another 
way in which to engage modern conversations in society and the church. Today issues of 
gender and sexuality have the tendency to dominate the conversations of theologians – 
some preferring to maintain more traditional perspectives, and others pressing towards 
new understandings (with a wide spectrum along which each finds their own place). 
Gregory’s approach, while not standing aside and ignoring the issues, would be to rather 
understand these concerns in a secondary place. Gregory, rather than being immersed in 
these concerns, saw the spiritual life as being one of overcoming, transcending (think 
particularly, of his view of Macrina) gender and sexuality. His place would be above the 
spectrum, and not along it.  
Lastly, Gregory’s view of God as the infinity which fulfills humanity, becoming 
“all in all” is a hope to be considered. Perhaps Gregory’s lack of consistent, or dogmatic, 
insistence can provide a framework for modern discussions. God, whose very nature is 
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incomprehensible, has given humanity all things – an identity, a way of life, and a hope 
for a world to come. Nyssen, using the images available to him through the scriptures, 
traditions, and life of the church describes the eschaton with a multiplicity of images. 
While not being settled into definitive belief, perhaps it is not too far to hope as Gregory 
does in one of these visions and hope for the restoration of all. 
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